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The First Amendment Structure for Speakers and
Speech
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes*
ABSTRACT
A noticeable trend in the Roberts Court’s free speech decisions
is heightened attention to the dimensions of the First Amendment.
From holding false factual statements, violent video games, and
animal cruelty depictions are covered by the First Amendment, to
determining that a legislator’s vote, the government’s acceptance of a
monument, and a law school’s refusal to allow access to military
recruiters are not, the Court has highlighted the importance of
evaluating both the scope of the First Amendment and the
appropriate attribution of communicative efforts. But the Court has
failed to announce an overarching structural framework for resolving
these prefatory coverage and attribution issues, instead
compartmentalizing speech and speaker concerns into separate
doctrinal strands.
This Article illustrates the interrelationship of these speech and
speaker issues and their amenability to a structural framework based
upon historical traditions and contemporary communicative utility.
Linguistic communications presumptively fall within First
Amendment coverage except when historically treated as outside the
guarantee’s scope or when traditionally viewed as attributable to the
government or polity. The presumption, though, is reversed for
nonlinguistic communicative attempts; founding-era traditions
indicating the form’s predominant expressiveness are necessary to
presume coverage. Yet even communicative efforts outside the First
Amendment’s presumptive scope may be covered based on
contemporary insights regarding the expressive value of the
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communicative effort when compared to its associated harms.
The Supreme Court’s doctrine supporting this coverage
structure reveals both the salience of originalism in determining the
First Amendment’s baseline scope and the implausibility of a single
unifying free expression theory. The fundamental question of First
Amendment coverage is informed by a combination of historical
practices and contemporary insights. These traditions and attitudes
have not developed from an integrative force, but through our
nation’s experiences and an ongoing dialectic in which different
visions of the core purposes of the First Amendment have been
proposed, debated, and absorbed within the American expressive
commitment.
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I. THE BEDROCK INQUIRIES
What is speech? Who is speaking?
1
These questions are at the core of the First Amendment. Yet
despite the Roberts Court’s heightened attention to resolving them
1

See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (2004) [hereinafter
Schauer, Boundaries] (“[Q]uestions about the involvement of the First Amendment
in the first instance are often far more consequential than are the issues surrounding
the strength of protection that the First Amendment affords.”); R. George Wright,
What Counts as “Speech” in the First Place? Determining the Scope of the Free Speech Clause,
37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217, 1218 (2010) (urging that the “most fundamental question in
free speech law” is “whether ‘speech,’ for purposes of the First Amendment, is even
present”).
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in recent cases, puzzles remain. Why is a legislator voting “aye” or
2
“yes” to a proposition not engaged in First Amendment speech,
while a citizen signing a referendum petition or providing a
3
campaign contribution to a legislator is? Why is the commercial sale
4
of the most violent video games First Amendment speech, but a law
school’s refusal to allow or to equalize access to military recruiters on
5
campus is not? Why is a particularized message required for speech
6
coverage in some situations, but no discernible message is necessary
7
in other situations? What allows an individual’s words or utterances
to be attributed under the First Amendment to the government or
8
polity?
The Court has not pronounced a structure for resolving these
9
puzzles.
Noted treatises typically compartmentalize speech and
speaker issues into various sub-strands of First Amendment doctrine
without acknowledging either their interconnection or their import
10
as a prerequisite to constitutional protection. Nonetheless, the first
inquiry in any First Amendment challenge should be whether the
challenger is engaged in expression covered by the First Amendment,
which entails examining both the scope of the First Amendment and
the attribution of the speech. Only after these questions are
answered can the challenge be categorized into the appropriate level
11
of scrutiny and resolved under the governing standard.
This initial coverage determination is challenging, though,
2

Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347–51 (2011).
See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2817–18 (2010) (referendum petition);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–23 (1976) (campaign contributions).
4
Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733–38 (2011).
5
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64–
66 (2006).
6
See, e.g., Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2350; Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 64–66.
7
See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 476–77 (2009); Hurley
v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
8
See, e.g., Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2350; Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S.
550, 560–66 (2005).
9
Cf. Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 1, at 1767 (highlighting that the question of
First Amendment coverage is “rarely addressed, and the answer is too often simply
assumed”).
10
See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
949–50, 959–60 (4th ed. 2011) (organizing First Amendment materials into various
sections without a section dedicated to coverage issues); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1252–53 (8th ed. 2010) (same).
11
See Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34
VAND. L. REV. 265, 268 (1981) [hereinafter Schauer, Categories] (contending an
implicit initial issue in every First Amendment case is ascertaining “whether the
conduct at issue constitutes ‘speech,’” which must be resolved before deciding the
constitutionality of the government’s action).
3
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because the First Amendment’s scope is both broader and narrower
than the spoken, printed, or written word. The concept is broader
because the First Amendment covers forms of nonlinguistic
communication and conduct, such as marches or burning a flag,
although not every action that transmits some message qualifies for
12
On the other hand, the concept is narrower because
coverage.
some words that an individual writes, publishes, or utters are
considered outside the First Amendment’s scope, including not only
well-recognized exceptions such as incitement, fighting words, and
13
obscenity, but also at least some aspects of the law of antitrust,
employment regulation, professional regulation, and securities
14
In addition, even otherwise covered expression is
regulation.
sometimes attributed to the government or polity, such as when the
15
government funds or controls the message.
This Article assembles a First Amendment coverage structure for
resolving such issues. Leaving aside further questions regarding the
appropriate level of scrutiny and the ultimate constitutionality of
16
various types of speech regulation,
I will then sketch the
implications this speech coverage framework has on First
Amendment theory.
The framework I identify depends on two primary
12

See, e.g., Peter Meijes Tiersma, Nonverbal Communication and the Freedom of
“Speech”, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1525, 1531–37 (summarizing Supreme Court decisions on
when such conduct falls within the First Amendment’s scope).
13
See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words).
14
See Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 1, at 1768, 1778–84; James Weinstein,
Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L.
REV. 491, 491–92 (2011) [hereinafter Weinstein, Participatory Democracy]. Cf. Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
15
Cf. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–66 (2005).
16
The only constitutional protection afforded to communicative efforts outside
the First Amendment’s scope is that a government regulation must not (except in
cases of government speech) discriminate based on any ideas, messages, or
viewpoints that may be contained in the challenger’s utterance; otherwise, the
government is free to regulate, restrict, or even ban such utterances. See, e.g., R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–92 (1992). In contrast, communicative efforts
within the First Amendment typically cannot be regulated by the government to
prevent communicative harms unless the regulation is the only means to serve a
compelling government objective. See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination
Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 236–38 (2012). The government is allowed, however, to
regulate First Amendment speech to prevent deleterious effects from its noncommunicative aspects under a lower threshold of scrutiny. The government also
has more leeway when either overseeing a restrictive environment (such as the
military or prisons) or acting in a proprietary capacity as an employer, educator, or
property owner. See id.
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considerations: historical traditions and communicative impact. The
first consideration is the historical traditional view of whether the
communicative effort is within the scope of expressive constitutional
guarantees. Linguistic communications are presumptively covered by
the First Amendment, unless excluded based on an unbroken
tradition of judicial acquiescence in laws prohibiting or regulating
that subcategory of communication or of viewing the communication
as belonging to the government or to the general public. On the
other hand, nonlinguistic communications are only entitled to
presumptive First Amendment status when traditionally treated as
comparable in expressive value to linguistic communications.
While all traditionally covered linguistic and nonlinguistic
communications are within the scope of the First Amendment, the
second consideration acknowledges that nontraditional forms may
also fall within the ambit of First Amendment speech, depending on
contemporary insights regarding the value of the communicative
effort in light of its associated harms. This valuation depends on
balancing the utility of the communicative thought conveyed through
hearing or sight to a recipient, the harm likely to arise from that
17
particular form, and the attribution of the message. This allows the
Court, for example, to find that a traditional linguistic exclusion from
First Amendment speech, such as defamation, deserves some First
18
Amendment coverage, and that a nontraditional nonlinguistic form,
19
such as a sit-in, is First Amendment speech in certain contexts.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II reviews the Supreme
Court’s doctrine on the First Amendment’s range and displays the
current methodological consistencies across the various coverage
issues. Part III then develops the structural framework I have
identified and evaluates its normative and analytical utility. Part IV
concludes with the insights on First Amendment theory that might be
gleaned from this structural framework. The Court’s decisions have
incorporated original First Amendment practices as a coverage
baseline, but have supplemented this baseline with contemporary
valuations of the relative costs and benefits of extending speech
coverage in light of both the lessons from past American experiences
and an ongoing public dialogue on our commitment to expressive
freedom.
17

Cf. John Greenman, On Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1340 (2008)
(contending that free-speech “communication occurs when Person A conveys a
thought to Person B, and Person B freely chooses whether to accept that thought”).
18
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268–76 (1964).
19
See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (plurality opinion).
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S SCOPE
Putting aside the religious liberty guarantees, the First
Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
20
of grievances.” The expressive freedoms thus include speech, press,
assembly, and petition, although the Court has long emphasized
“speech” as the paramount guarantee, providing minimal additional
21
substantive import to the other separate expressive elements.
From a textual perspective, the predominant ordinary meanings
of “speech,” “press,” and “petition” relate to the spoken, printed, or
22
written word, all of which are linguistic forms of communication.
This does not mean, of course, that only linguistic communications
fall within the coverage of the First Amendment; indeed, “the
right . . . to assemble” is a right to gather together or congregate,
23
which does not encompass a predominantly linguistic connotation.
Historical evidence also confirms the framers did not intend to
24
protect only the spoken, printed, or written word. Yet such linguistic
25
connotations apparently were the foremost consideration, which
supports separately analyzing linguistic and nonlinguistic forms of
communication in attempting to ascertain the First Amendment’s
range. Moreover, Supreme Court precedent indicates different
coverage presumptions apply to linguistic and nonlinguistic
communications.

20

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See, e.g., Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2494–98 (2011);
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669–70 (1991).
22
“Speech” traditionally has been defined as the utterance of sounds or the
articulation of words to describe ideas, perceptions, or emotions. WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2189 (1976) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S THIRD];
WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1062 (1848) [hereinafter
WEBSTER’S AMERICAN]. A traditional definition of “press” is printed or written matter.
WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra, at 1794–95; WEBSTER’S AMERICAN, supra, at 864. And
“petition” has typically been defined as a written request to those in authority.
WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra, at 1690; WEBSTER’S AMERICAN, supra, at 820. All of these are
predominantly linguistic forms related to language and speech.
23
WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra note 22, at 113; WEBSTER’S AMERICAN, supra note 22, at
76.
24
See Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of the First
Amendment, 97 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1059–63 (2009) [hereinafter Volokh, Symbolic
Expression].
25
See id. at 1083.
21
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A. Presumptive Coverage for Linguistic Communications
The use of words or language to attempt to communicate any
assertion, idea, perception, emotion, or thought—or any attempt to
receive such words or language—is presumptively covered by the First
Amendment.
Outside specific, judicially defined traditional
26
exclusions, the Supreme Court’s contemporary decisions have not
denied First Amendment coverage to any linguistic communicative
27
28
29
attempt, whether the purpose is to advocate, persuade, actuate,
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
inform, advertise, proselytize, solicit, entertain, brag, titillate,
26

See infra Parts II.A.1 & II.A.2.
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52 (1976) (recognizing First Amendment
right of political candidates and citizens to advocate); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (protecting newspaper advertisement that “communicated
information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and
sought financial support on behalf of a movement”).
28
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670 (2011) (explaining
that “the fear that speech might persuade provides no lawful basis for quieting it” in
all but the rarest of circumstances); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
(holding First Amendment protects corporate independent expenditures to
persuade voters).
29
See, e.g., Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670 (“Speech remains protected even when it may
‘stir people to action . . . .’”) (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220
(2010)); Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (“The claim that
the expressions were intended to exercise a coercive impact on respondent does not
remove them from the reach of the First Amendment.”); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 537 (1945) (explaining First Amendment “extends to more than abstract
discussion, unrelated to action” but instead covers “the opportunity to persuade to
action”).
30
See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762–66 (1976) (holding First Amendment protects disseminating
commercial factual information); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 391–92 (1962)
(“The First Amendment envisions that persons be given the opportunity to inform
the community of both sides of the issue . . . .”).
31
See, e.g., Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988) (“Lawyer
advertising is in the category of constitutionally protected commercial speech.”);
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)
(“The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the
informational function of advertising.”).
32
See, e.g., Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
647 (1981) (discussing precedent protecting the expression of religious views);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308–10 (1940) (concluding the First
Amendment prevents the government from “unduly suppress[ing] free
communication of views, religious or other”).
33
See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 611
(2003) (“The First Amendment protects the right to engage in charitable
solicitation.”); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421–22, 422 n.5 (1988) (holding
soliciting signatures for a petition involved First Amendment speech); Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (“[C]haritable
appeals for funds . . . are within the protection of the First Amendment.”).
34
See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977)
27
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40

embarrass, offend, disgust, shock, or address any other “field of
41
human interest.” And the mode of communication—as long as it is
42
has not been traditionally reserved for government purposes —does
not matter. Thus, the Court has held that the First Amendment
covers not only linguistic communications in historical forms such as
speeches, newspapers, handbills, leaflets, pamphlets, banners, signs,
43
plays, and books, but twentieth century forms as well, including the
(“There is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First Amendment
protection.”); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (holding that the divide
“between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive” to govern First
Amendment coverage).
35
See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545–48 (2012) (plurality
opinion) (protecting false claims regarding military awards); id. at 2553–54 (Breyer,
J., concurring).
36
See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000)
(concluding sexually oriented programming covered by First Amendment); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853, 874–75 (1997) (holding First Amendment protection
extended to indecent sexually explicit textual material on the Internet); Sable
Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (holding indecent dial-aporn messages covered by the First Amendment).
37
See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982) (“Speech
does not lose its protected character . . . simply because it may embarrass others or
coerce them into action.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723–24
(1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The dominant purpose of the First Amendment
was to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing
information.”).
38
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219–20 (2011) (protecting offensive
funeral picketing inflicting “great pain”); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715–16
(2000) (recognizing offensive communications are not outside the First
Amendment’s scope).
39
See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011)
(protecting excessively violent video games in part because “disgust is not a valid
basis for restricting expression”).
40
See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25–26 (1971) (acknowledging the
emotive force of the words “Fuck the Draft” in protecting its display on a jacket).
41
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945) (concluding free speech and press
rights “are not confined to any field of human interest”).
42
See infra Part II.A.2.
43
See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007) (applying the First
Amendment to words on a banner); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981) (holding that soliciting donations and distributing
religious literature were within First Amendment’s scope); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v.
Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92 (1977) (holding “for sale” and “sold” signs
protected by the First Amendment); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,
557–58 (1975) (holding theater production covered by First Amendment in part
because “theater usually is that acting out—or singing out—of the written word”);
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (protecting
two newspapers from prior restraint); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 61–63
(1970) (recognizing that the First Amendment covers amateur actors in street
theatrical performances); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)
(extending First Amendment protection to paid newspaper advertisement); Bantam
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44

linguistic components in motion pictures, television and radio
45
46
47
broadcasts, cable television, the Internet, and interactive video
48
All communicative attempts incorporating linguistic
games.
elements (including sign language, Morse code, or other
representations of specific words or letters) thus presumptively fall
within the First Amendment’s scope, with the presumption rebuttable
only if there is an established tradition of exclusion.
This is not to say that all linguistic communications
presumptively receive the same level of First Amendment protection—
rather, only that they are all presumptively covered by and within the scope
of the First Amendment. When a linguistic communication is made,
the presumption is the First Amendment applies, even though the
rigor of judicial scrutiny may vary depending on such factors as the
nature of the government regulation, the medium or locale in which
the communication is made, and the extent to which the
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64 n.6 (1963) (concluding that the First
Amendment “embraces the circulation of books as well as their publication”); Smith
v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959) ( “[P]ublication and dissemination of books
and other forms of the printed word furnish very familiar applications of . . .
constitutionally protected freedoms.”); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532–34
(1945) (protecting speech urging workers to unionize); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 143 (1943) (protecting door-to-door leaflet distribution); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108–11 (1943) (protecting door-to-door distribution of
religious tracts with a request for funds); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943)
(protecting handbill distribution on public streets); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 450–52 (1938) (holding that the First Amendment protected distributing
pamphlets, leaflets, magazines, and periodicals, which were “historic weapons in the
defense of liberty”); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 717–20 (1931)
(protecting an allegedly defamatory newspaper from prior restraint).
44
See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208 (1975) (protecting
film projection at drive-in movie theaters); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495, 501 (1952) (holding “motion pictures are a significant medium for the
communication of ideas” covered by the First Amendment).
45
See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2320 (2012)
(recognizing First Amendment implications of FCC’s television indecency policy);
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746–51 (1978) (holding radio broadcasting
enjoys limited First Amendment protection). While these decisions indicate that the
level of protection for broadcast media is at least currently more limited than it is for
other modes of communication, television and radio broadcast media are
nonetheless undoubtedly within the First Amendment’s scope.
46
See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (“Cable
programmers and cable operators engage in and transmit speech . . . .”); City of Los
Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986) (holding that cable
television operations communicated messages covered by the First Amendment).
47
See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864–80 (1997) (applying free speech
principles to the Internet).
48
See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (holding
that interactive video games warrant First Amendment coverage because they
“communicate ideas—and even social messages”).
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communication entails a matter of public concern.
Yet the
presumption for linguistic aspects of communication, irrespective of
50
their perceived value, is that the First Amendment at least “shows
51
up.”
52
Although some early precedents suggested a more limited view,
the Supreme Court’s adoption of presumptive First Amendment
coverage for all (even supposedly worthless) linguistic
communications is apparent in its recent decisions. Consider this
passage from United States v. Stevens: “Most of what we say to one
another lacks ‘religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic,
historical, or artistic value (let alone serious value), but it is still
53
sheltered from government regulation.”
Or this one: “Even
‘[w]holly neutral futilities . . . come under the protection of free
54
speech as fully as do Keats’ poems or Donne’s sermons.’” The Court
has thus acknowledged that a use of words—no matter for what
purpose—presumptively implicates the First Amendment.
This is further evidenced by the Court’s prompt extension of
First Amendment coverage to cable television, the Internet, and
interactive video games, which all transmit at least some linguistic
expression, in contrast to the Court’s early twentieth century
55
dawdling for motion pictures, which when first introduced did not.
The Court in 1915 determined in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Commission that silent motion pictures were not protected by state
56
constitutional expressive guarantees.
Decades passed before the

49

Cf. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 949–50, 959–60.
See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (“Though we can see
nothing of any possible value to society in these [true crime] magazines, they are as
much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature.”).
51
Professor Schauer employed this apt colloquialism in Boundaries, supra note 1,
at 1767.
52
See, e.g., Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 230, 242–44 (1915)
(concluding that silent motion pictures were not covered under the Ohio
Constitution as part of “a free press and liberty of opinion” because of their capacity
for harm, especially to minors), abrogated in part by Joseph Burnstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
53
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 479 (2010).
54
Id. (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (quoting Winters, 333
U.S. at 528 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))). For a thorough and insightful analysis of
how even nonsense can implicate traditional First Amendment values, see Joseph
Blocher, Nonsense and the Freedom of Speech: What Meaning Means for the First Amendment,
63 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2014).
55
See Samantha Barbas, How the Movies Became Speech, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 665,
672–73 (2012) (noting that early films were “visual novelties” consisting only of
boxing or dancing footage).
56
Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 230, 242–44 (1915).
50
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Court reversed course and afforded First Amendment coverage to
movies in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, with the Court reasoning that
motion pictures communicated ideas in addition to entertaining and
that any harms from motion pictures did not require dispensing with
57
First Amendment principles. Burstyn also highlighted that it was
“not without significance that talking pictures were first produced in
1926, eleven years after the Mutual decision,” foreshadowing the
Court’s modern presumption that communications with linguistic
58
elements fall within the First Amendment’s scope.
City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc. illustrates this
presumption, with the Court holding after a mere seven sentences of
reasoning that cable broadcasting “plainly implicates” the First
59
Amendment. The Court explained that the cable company’s factual
recitation regarding its business established that, “through original
programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations
or programs to include in its repertoire, [the company] seeks to
communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide
60
variety of formats.” The Court next analogized cable television’s
transmission of speech and ideas to “the traditional enterprises of
newspaper and book publishers, public speakers, and
61
pamphleteers.”
This comparison led the Supreme Court to
summarily conclude cable television operations fell within the scope
62
of the First Amendment, just as wireless broadcasting did.
The Court extended First Amendment coverage to the Internet
in 1997 without any separate analysis at all. In Reno v. ACLU, after
recounting in the factual recitation the “wide variety of
communication and information retrieval methods” on the Internet
that provide a forum for communication “as diverse as human
63
thought,” the Court employed First Amendment precedents and
concepts to review the government regulations at issue without
independently considering whether the Internet fell within the scope
64
of the First Amendment. The Court thereby indicated the coverage
65
issue was self-evident, warranting no explanation.
57

Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952).
Id. at 502 n.12.
59
City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns. Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 494–95.
63
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851–52 (1997).
64
Id. at 864–80.
65
See id. While portions of Reno compared and contrasted the Internet to other
protected mediums of expression, this comparison was not undertaken to ascertain
58
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The Court likewise treated First Amendment coverage for
interactive video games as a largely self-evident proposition in Brown
66
v. Entertainment Merchants Association. As a prelude to defending the
application of strict scrutiny to California’s regulation of violent video
games, the Court noted that “California correctly acknowledges that
67
video games qualify for First Amendment protection.” In accord
with its longstanding precedent that “[t]he line between the
informing and the entertaining is too elusive” to be the touchstone of
68
the First Amendment, the Court explained that video games, like
books, plays and movies, “communicate ideas—and even social
messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as characters,
dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the
medium (such as the player’s interaction with the virtual world).”
That, according to the Court, “suffice[d] to confer First Amendment
69
protection.”
Accordingly, the “basic principles” of the First
Amendment applied to video games, including exacting judicial
70
scrutiny of content-based speech regulations.
With interactive video games, then, just like cable television and
the Internet previously, the Supreme Court applied the First
Amendment to new media integrating linguistic communications
with little or no discussion.
This rapid acceptance of new
technologies, and the Court’s willingness to afford First Amendment
coverage to any communication conveyed through the written,
spoken, or printed word, indicate that the First Amendment
presumptively applies to all linguistic communications in whatever
form and for whatever purpose. Only the exceptions to speech
coverage for linguistic communications necessitate justification;
otherwise, coverage is presumed. The use of words—whether
spoken, printed, or written—should be presumed to be First

First Amendment coverage, but rather the appropriate level of First Amendment
scrutiny. The government contended that regulations of the Internet should be
subject to the lesser scrutiny afforded to broadcast media regulations. Id. at 868.
The Court rejected this contention, concluding that the government had not
licensed the Internet’s creation, the Internet was not as invasive as broadcast media,
and the Internet was not a scarce expressive commodity. Id. at 868–70. Instead, the
Internet was a “vast democratic forum[]” that combined traditional print and news
services with interactive platforms for dialogue and other content that allowed users
to “become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any
soapbox” and a “pamphleteer” disseminating throughout the world. Id. at 869–70.
66
Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
67
Id. at 2733.
68
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
69
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733.
70
Id. at 2734.
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Amendment speech, with the presumption rebuttable only in two
circumstances: (1) the words fall within a so-called “unprotected”
category, or (2) the words are attributed to the government or polity.
1. Categories Outside First Amendment Coverage
A longstanding limitation on First Amendment coverage is that
“certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech” may be
prohibited or punished without “rais[ing] any Constitutional
71
problem.”
Linguistic exchanges that fall within one of these
unprotected classes or categories are outside the normal scope of the
72
The
First Amendment, in a “First Amendment Free Zone.”
government has free reign to regulate, punish, or prohibit such
communications, as long as the government does not act as an
ideological censor based on the ideas, messages, or viewpoints within
73
the proscribed category.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire furnishes an early illustration of this
categorical exclusion doctrine. Chaplinsky’s conviction for deriding
a city official to his face as a “God damned racketeer” and “damned
fascist” was upheld on the basis that the government could
criminalize such “fighting words” as one of those classes of speech
“which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional
74
problem.” The government thus did not have to satisfy any type of
First Amendment judicial scrutiny to have Chaplinsky’s conviction
upheld for uttering fighting words—such utterances were simply
outside the First Amendment’s scope.
The significance of this classification requires careful attention
to identifying these uncovered categories. Chaplinsky listed the “the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
75
‘fighting words.’” Subsequent decisions have narrowed the scope of
some of these traditional categorical exceptions, while also
76
recognizing that Chaplinsky’s enumeration was incomplete. But a
71

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010) (quoting Bd. of Airport
Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987)).
73
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–92 (1992) (holding that, while a
general prohibition on fighting words would be constitutional, punishing only those
fighting words based on race, gender, or religion was unconstitutional).
74
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
75
Id.
76
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008) (acknowledging
offers to engage in illegal transactions as unprotected); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343, 359–60 (2003) (recognizing “true threats” as unprotected); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at
382–83 (acknowledging the narrowing “of the scope of the traditional categorical
exceptions for defamation and obscenity”); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64
72
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more fundamental issue than the grouping or listing of these
uncovered zones is ascertaining the means for their identification.
Chaplinsky’s evaluation of this issue was cursory. The Court first
mentioned that the regulation or prohibition of these “well-defined
and narrowly limited classes of speech” had “never been thought to
77
raise any Constitutional problem,” thereby intimating an approach
grounded in historical traditions and longstanding judicial
precedent. The Court continued, though, that “such utterances are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
78
morality.” This language suggested a balancing approach, weighing
the communicative value of the category of utterances against the
harm associated with that form of communication. Chaplinsky’s
rationale thus foreshadowed two potential methods to identify
utterances outside the First Amendment’s coverage.
The dual indication of a historical approach and a cost-benefit
analysis continued in subsequent Court decisions. Beauharnais v.
Illinois relied on both the history and continuing traditions of libel
laws, as well as reciting the “no essential part of any exposition of
ideas” conception from Chaplinsky, to hold that defamation was not
79
within the First Amendment’s ambit. To support its holding that
obscenity was outside First Amendment coverage, Roth v. United States
examined founding-era restrictions on blasphemy, profanity, and
obscenity, along with contemporary indicia of obscenity’s lack of
80
“redeeming social importance.” The Supreme Court’s holding in
New York v. Ferber that distributing child pornography was not covered
by the First Amendment relied on five separate considerations,
including both the historical understanding that “[i]t rarely has been
suggested” that First Amendment coverage extends to speech or
writing that is an integral part of unlawful conduct such as producing
(1982) (holding child pornography unprotected).
77
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72.
78
Id. at 572. To support this proposition, the Court cited to ZECHARIAH CHAFEE
JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 149–50 (1941). Professor Chafee argued that
obscenity, profanity, blasphemy, and libel were outside the scope of the First
Amendment, not for historical reasons, but because they “do not form an essential
part of any exposition of ideas, have a very slight social value as a step toward truth,
which is clearly outweighed by the social interests in order, morality, the training of
the young, and the peace of mind of those who hear and see.” Id.
79
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254–57 (1952).
80
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481–85 (1957). The contemporary
indications included judicial precedent, international agreements, and state and
federal obscenity laws. Id. at 484–85.
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81

child pornography, and the Court’s ad hoc balancing of “the evil to
be restricted [that] so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive
82
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul likewise
interests . . . at stake.”
acknowledged both the longstanding historical exclusion of these
types of utterances from First Amendment coverage and their limited
83
social utility in comparison to their deleterious impact.
Relying on such repeated references to speech valuation, the
government in United States v. Stevens contended that visual and
auditory depictions of animal cruelty constituted another categorical
exclusion from First Amendment coverage because the worth of such
84
depictions was minimal compared to their societal cost.
But in
Stevens, the Supreme Court emphatically rejected a simple balancing
test as the touchstone of First Amendment coverage, describing it as a
85
“startling and dangerous” proposition. The First Amendment itself,
according to the Court, was the American people’s balance of the
social costs and benefits of free speech, foreclosing “any attempt to
86
revise that judgment on the basis that some speech is not worth it.”
While acknowledging that its prior opinions had “described
historically unprotected categories of speech” as of de minimis worth
when compared to their societal toll, the Court maintained that such
statements were only “descriptive” and did not “set forth a test that
may be applied as a general matter to permit the Government to
imprison any speaker as long as his speech is deemed valueless or
unnecessary, or so long as an ad hoc calculus of costs and benefits
87
tilts in a statute’s favor.”
Instead, the Court predicated the
81

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761–62 (1982) (quoting Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)).
82
Id. at 763–64. The Court’s other complementary rationales included the
compelling state interest in safeguarding children from physical and psychological
harms, the connection between the distribution of child pornography and sexual
abuse of children, and the minuscule value of such materials. Id. at 757–64.
83
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (“From 1791 to the
present, however, our society . . . has permitted restrictions upon the content of
speech in a few limited areas, which are ‘of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.’” (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572)).
84
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 467–70 (2010). Stevens sold dog fight
videos in violation of a federal statute that criminalized the commercial creation,
sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty. Id. at 463–69. He
challenged his conviction on free speech grounds, with the government arguing that
such depictions were “categorically unprotected by the First Amendment.” Id. at
467–69.
85
Id. at 469–71.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 469–72.

RHODES (DO NOT DELETE)

410

4/2/2014 12:09 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:395

recognition of categories of unprotected speech on a historical
approach: a longstanding and ongoing tradition dating to the
founding of excluding the utterances from First Amendment
88
coverage.
Because no First Amendment tradition prohibited
portrayals of animal cruelty (even though the underlying acts of
cruelty have long been outlawed), depictions of animal cruelty were
not one of those communicative efforts—like obscenity, fraud, or
89
incitement—outside the First Amendment’s reach.
Although Stevens correctly required a showing of a longstanding
historical tradition to support a categorical exclusion from the First
Amendment’s coverage, the Court’s offhand remark downplaying the
balancing approach as merely “descriptive” contravened its earlier
precedents. Chaplinsky, after discussing the costs and benefits of
fighting words and other categories of uncovered utterances, cited to
Professor Chafee’s Free Speech in the United States, which contended
that the exclusions from First Amendment coverage depended on the
value of the communication at issue in comparison to its impact on
90
the social order. And the Ferber Court, while mentioning as one of
five considerations the speech integral to criminal conduct historical
exception, emphasized to a greater degree that “the evil to be
restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if
any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is
91
required.” Under no fair reading of these cases can the balancing
discussion be accurately described as merely “descriptive.”
Nonetheless, Stevens’s consequential insight that the Court’s
prior opinions did not support “a simple cost-benefit analysis” as the
92
touchstone of First Amendment coverage is undeniable. While costbenefit balancing was conducted in Chaplinsky and Ferber, their
analyses also incorporated at least a passing allusion to historical
exclusions as well. Roth and Beauharnais expatiated at length on
founding-era restrictions in holding that obscenity and libel were
outside the scope of the First Amendment, with comparative value
88

See id. at 469, 472.
Id. at 469–72.
90
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 n.4 (1942) (citing ZECHARIAH
CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 149–50 (1941)).
91
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761–64 (1982). Ferber also nowhere discussed
a need to ground a new unprotected speech category into a pre-existing category
with a longstanding tradition of exclusion. Id. As Professor Strossen noted, Stevens
was thus a “novel” recasting of Ferber. Nadine Strossen, United States v. Stevens:
Restricting Two Major Rationales for Content-Based Speech Restrictions, 2009–10 CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 67, 84–85.
92
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470–72 (emphasis added).
89
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93

receiving relatively short shrift.
The Court’s precedents before
Stevens supported both a historical approach and a balancing
approach—not one to the exclusion of the other.
These precedents thus confirm the holdings in Stevens and
subsequent cases that categorical exclusions from First Amendment
94
coverage require a longstanding historical tradition. But while such
a tradition is a necessary condition of exclusion, it is not by itself
sufficient. History alone cannot justify the First Amendment’s
contemporary scope.
Current protections for profanity and
blasphemy were not contemplated as part of free expression at the
founding, nor were the modern protections afforded to defamation
and incitement.
The Supreme Court’s twentieth century
circumscriptions of founding practices regarding unprotected
expression demonstrate that categorical exclusions necessitate both a
longstanding historical tradition and a continued contemporary
perspective that the harms associated with that type of utterance
exceed its relative benefits. While the Court cannot augment the
historic categorical exclusions, it may narrow or even eliminate them
under contemporary evaluations of their continued propriety.
Profanity proscriptions are illustrative. The original states
enforced norms of respect and propriety regarding public
95
discourse—criminalizing public profanity, blasphemy, or both.
Such laws were considered constitutional despite state constitutional
96
free speech protections, and were still prevalent—and regarded as
enforceable—from the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
93

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481–85 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250, 254–57 (1952).
94
See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544–47 (2012) (plurality
opinion) (relying on Stevens to reject the government’s assertion that false statements
fell outside the First Amendment’s coverage); Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S.
Ct. 2729, 2734–35 (2011) (following Stevens to hold that violent video games were not
outside the First Amendment); Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469–72.
95
See Roth, 354 U.S. at 482 n.12 (listing founding-era state statutory provisions
regarding profanity and blasphemy); LEONARD W. LEVY, BLASPHEMY: VERBAL OFFENSE
AGAINST THE SACRED, FROM MOSES TO SALMAN RUSHDIE 400–23 (1995) (discussing
American state blasphemy laws and prosecutions during the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries).
96
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. 206, 220–21 (1838) (holding
blasphemy statute did not violate state constitution); Updegraph v. Commonwealth,
11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 399–408 (Pa. 1824) (upholding blasphemy statute against
constitutional challenge while reversing conviction on other grounds); cf. State v.
Chandler, 2 Del. 553 (1837) (upholding state statute criminalizing blasphemy against
constitutional challenges based on religious freedoms); People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns.
290, 294–96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (holding that blasphemous and profane
disparagements of Christianity were common law offenses despite state constitutional
protections of religious freedom).
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97

into the twentieth century.
In 1942, Chaplinsky even listed “the
profane” as one of the classes of utterances outside the First
98
Amendment’s scope. But profanity’s categorical exclusion from the
First Amendment is no more. Not one of the Court’s opinions over
the last half a century has mentioned profane utterances as
99
uncovered by the First Amendment. Rather, profanity today is often
100
protected from government sanctions. Cohen v. California famously
held that the government could not criminalize the public display of
101
In doing so, the Court emphasized
the word “Fuck” on a jacket.
speech’s import in the American political system, which necessitated
governmental regulatory forbearance regarding almost all forms of
individual expression, unless necessary for undeniable government

97

See, e.g., Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897) (stating in dicta that
the constitutional guarantee of free expression did not “permit the publication of
libels, blasphemous or indecent articles, or other publications injurious to public
morals or private reputation”); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 422, 471–76 (1st ed. 1868) (discussing profanity and
blasphemy laws as comporting with constitutional precepts of free speech and
religious liberty).
98
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Chaplinsky did not list
the blasphemous, though, as uncovered speech, presumably because the Court’s
decision two years earlier in Cantwell v. Connecticut indicated that characterizing
speech as blasphemous did not remove First Amendment protection. 310 U.S. 296,
305 (1940). Cantwell’s conviction for breaching the peace by playing a record to two
men that attacked all organized religions as the work of Satan was reversed because
the government “may not unduly suppress free communication of views, religious or
other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions.” Id. at 308–09. Any
lingering doubt on the constitutionality of blasphemy statutes was dispelled by Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, which held that, under free speech and press principles, “the
state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful
to them.” 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952).
99
This contention only appears in dissents quoting Chaplinsky. See, e.g., Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 430 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 385 (1974) (White, J., dissenting); Lewis v. City of New
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 140–41 (1974) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Papish v. Bd. of
Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 676 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Rosenfeld v. New
Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 903 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting).
100
See, e.g, Lewis, 415 U.S. at 133–34 (invalidating a state statute prohibiting
cursing, reviling, or opprobrious language towards a police officer); Papish, 410 U.S.
at 667–70 (protecting on-campus distribution of a newspaper with “Mother Fucker”
in an article title); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23–26 (1971) (protecting a
display of “Fuck the Draft” on jacket). This does not mean, of course, that profanity
is immune from government regulation, especially in certain contexts involving
minors. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683–86 (1986)
(upholding sanction for student’s vulgar assembly speech); FCC v. Pacifica Found,
438 U.S. 726, 748–50 (1978) (upholding sanction for “filthy” radio broadcast).
101
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 23–26.
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102

interests.
The government’s claimed concern with propriety and
respect was simply insufficient, according to Cohen, to justify
103
interfering with the open debate vital to our society. The choice of
linguistic expression encompasses not only ideas but also emotions,
with words frequently chosen “as much for their emotive as their
104
cognitive force.”
These contemporary insights regarding the
emotive force of even vulgar language now prohibit profanity’s
criminalization, despite the contrary practices at the founding. Only
those profane utterances that meet another categorical exception—
such as “fighting words” in a face-to-face exchange in circumstances
that would cause the average addressee to respond violently and
105
breach the peace—are now outside the First Amendment’s scope.
A similar desirable progression occurred for defamation. The
original founding states prosecuted libels, without considering such
prosecutions as inconsistent with state constitutional or natural law
106
principles of free speech. Throughout the nineteenth century and
into the twentieth, the judiciary continued to view state expressive
guarantees as not undermining the common-law and statutory
107
doctrines subjecting libels to criminal and civil sanction. Based on
this ongoing historical tradition, Beauharnais held in 1952 that
102

Id. at 24–25.
Id.
104
Id. at 26.
105
Id. at 20, 23–26; accord Lewis, 415 U.S. at 132–34; Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518, 528 (1972). While Chaplinsky held that epithets hurled at a city marshal such as
“God damned racketeer” and “damned Fascist” were fighting words, even though
under the presented circumstances there was no reasonable likelihood of an actual
breach of the peace, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions have clarified that
fighting words require a likelihood, under the presented circumstances, that “the
person addressed would make an immediate violent response.” Gooding, 405 U.S. at
528.
106
In some states, the state constitution’s expressive guarantee specifically
authorized prosecuting libels and then detailed defenses, evidentiary rules, and
appropriate jury determinations. See, e.g., Del. Const. of 1792 art. I, § 5; Pa. Const. of
1790 art. IX, § 7; R.I. Const. of 1842 art. I, § 20. In other states, founding era state
judicial decisions established that libel prosecutions did not violate free speech
principles. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 304, 313 (1825) (holding
state constitutional press guarantee did not abrogate indictments for criminal libel);
People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 391–94 (N.Y. 1804) (Kent, J.) (concluding that
liberty of press authorized evidence regarding the truth but did not protect false
libelous statements); Commonwealth v. Morris, 3 Va. 176 (1811) (affirming criminal
conviction for libel). Such prosecutions were authorized by the criminal statutes or
the common law of almost all the original states. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 482 n.11 (1957) (listing provisions).
107
See COOLEY, supra note 97, at 420–26 (maintaining that constitutional speech
and press liberties did not preclude civil and criminal punishment for common law
libels).
103
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libelous utterances were outside “the area of constitutionally
108
Nevertheless, twelve years later, in New York
protected speech.”
Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court reversed course and proclaimed that
“libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional
109
limitations.”
Sullivan emphasized the First Amendment’s
overarching aspiration to ensure the government’s responsiveness to
the people through “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate and
110
the unfettered exchange of ideas.
In light of this aspiration, even
erroneous or defamatory statements about public officials cannot be
wholly withdrawn from the First Amendment’s scope without
squelching the “breathing room” essential to a frank, unrestrained,
111
and vigorous civic discourse. The Court has accordingly developed,
in Sullivan and its progeny, a complex set of constitutional
protections for defamatory utterances that safeguard all but the truly
malicious contributions to the public debate while preserving
reputational interests (especially those of private citizens) to the
112
extent possible.
Further discussion of these newfound constraints
on traditional libel sanctions is not necessary to the lesson from their
very existence—based on contemporary insights regarding the need
to protect even false and defamatory statements to achieve the First
Amendment’s fundamental objectives, constitutional coverage was
extended to a historical categorical exclusion.
The same lesson is evident from the narrowing of the categorical
exclusion for obscenity. While statutory provisions against and
common law prosecutions of obscenity were absent in the first few
113
decades following American independence, by 1815 American
courts began to recognize the English common law crime for morally
corruptive exhibitions or publications of obscene and indecent
114
materials.
The states and the federal government soon thereafter
115
introduced distinct statutory crimes for publishing sexual materials,
108

Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254–57, 266 (1952). The Court noted
that every American jurisdiction at the time criminalized libels directed at
individuals. Id. at 255 n.5.
109
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
110
Id. at 269–70.
111
Id. at 271–73.
112
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 1078–79.
113
See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Sex, Violence, and the First Amendment, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1857, 1863 (2007) [hereinafter Stone, Sex].
114
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336, 337 (1821) (upholding
common law prosecution against publisher of “Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure”);
Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91 (Pa. 1815) (upholding common law
prosecution against exhibitor of pornographic drawings).
115
See, e.g., Comstock Act, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873); Tariff Act, ch. 270, § 28, 5
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with twenty of the then-existing thirty-five states enacting prohibitions
on publishing or circulating obscene materials by the Civil War’s
116
Courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth century
conclusion.
not only failed to mention any constitutional difficulty with these
117
statutes, but also upheld convictions under them based solely on
whether an isolated excerpt from the work could deprave and
118
corrupt those susceptible to immoral influences.
But despite the
Supreme Court’s continued adherence today to a categorical
exclusion for obscenity, the breadth of the obscenity exception has
been narrowed significantly from these earlier cases.
Modern precedents demand that a work is only obscene if it
contains patently offensive depictions or descriptions of specifically
defined sexual conduct, appeals in its entirety to the prurient interest
in sex under contemporary community standards as adjudged by the
average person, and lacks serious artistic, literary, political, or
119
scientific value when viewed in its entirety. This standard prevents
materials from being categorically excluded from First Amendment
coverage simply because some passage or depiction might deprave
the morals of a particularly susceptible individual, as was the case in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Today, even works
depicting patently offensive sexual conduct proscribed by law are
covered by the First Amendment, unless the government establishes
both that the work appeals to a “shameful” or “morbid” interest in
120
sex, and that the reasonable person would find that the work has no
121
In this manner, obscenity now partially depends
serious value.
upon the potential societal harms from, and the redeeming value of,
Stat. 548, 566 (1842); Act of May, 1821, ch. 22, § 69, Conn. Stat. Laws 165; Act of
Nov. 15, 1821, ch. 12, § 23, Laws of Vt. 271.
116
See Donna I. Dennis, Obscenity Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the NineteenthCentury United States, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 369, 384 (2002).
117
See, e.g., In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 134–35 (1892) (indicating that circulating
obscene books and papers does not fall within freedom of communication); Ex parte
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736–37 (1878) (upholding the Comstock Act, which prohibited
the transportation through the mail of various immoral items, against First
Amendment challenge).
118
See, e.g., MacFadden v. United States, 165 F. 51, 52 (3d Cir. 1908) (affirming an
obscenity conviction despite portions of the magazine being unobjectionable);
United States v. Kennerly, 209 F. 119, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (Hand, J.) (reluctantly
refusing to dismiss an indictment under binding precedent as some isolated parts of
the book might have a corrupting influence); United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas.
1093, 1103–05 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (finding no error in an obscenity jury charge
focusing on tendency to suggest impure thoughts to susceptible individuals).
119
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973).
120
See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498 (1985).
121
See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987).
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the work.
The exclusion for advocating illegal activity has also been
appropriately narrowed based on contemporary understandings of its
societal benefits and harms. Seditious utterances were prosecuted as
criminal offenses under founding-era state common law,
122
notwithstanding state constitutional free expression guarantees.
While the federal government’s authority to prosecute seditious libel
was vigorously contested in America’s formative years due to the
Constitution’s enumeration of limited federal powers and the First
Amendment’s prohibition on congressional speech legislation, many
of those challenging the Sedition Act of 1798 acknowledged the
123
constitutionality of state sedition prosecutions. Moreover, not only
were seditious communications punished, but, as a general rule, any
communicative attempt that had a “bad tendency” to cause crime,
124
disorder, or immoral acts could be punished,
a view which
125
But in the midcontinued until early in the twentieth century.
122

See, e.g., David J. Jenkins, The Sedition Act of 1798 and the Incorporation of Seditious
Libel into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 154, 171–78 (2001)
(describing common law prosecutions for seditious libel in Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts, and Virginia, despite state constitutional press guarantees); JAMES
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 2:13-22 (1826) (recognizing that defamatory
publications against the government were punishable both by the civil and criminal
law). But see COOLEY, supra note 97, at 429–30 (urging English common-law rule on
seditious libel was not adopted by the states).
123
See, e.g., 2 Annals of Cong. 2106 (statement of Representative Macon) (arguing
against the Sedition Act because “persons might be prosecuted for a libel under the
State Governments”); Ky. Resolutions ¶ 3 (Nov. 1798) (urging the states retain “the
right of judging how far the licentiousness of speech and of the press may be
abridged.”). See also LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 307–08 (1985)
(opining that the Jeffersonians, while objecting to a sedition act by the national
government, did not object to similar restrictions imposed by the states). Accord
Jenkins, supra note 122, at 180 (noting that the opponents of the Sedition Act “were
primarily concerned with preserving states’ rights and, therefore, failed to discredit
the underlying principles of common-law seditious libel”).
124
See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”:
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 10–12 (2000). The
origins of the “bad tendency” test are traceable to Blackstone, who urged that the
state could punish “dangerous or offensive writings” with a “pernicious tendency”
against good order. See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Origins of the “Bad Tendency” Test: Free
Speech in Wartime, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 411, 432–33.
125
See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) (holding the state
could constitutionally punish those “utterances inimical to the public welfare,
tending to incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of
organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means”), overruled by
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277
(1915) (upholding a conviction for publishing an article encouraging a boycott
against those harassing nudists on the basis that the article encouraged and incited
“a breach of the state laws against indecent exposure”); Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S.
279, 294 (1904) (upholding the deportation of an alien on basis of anarchist views
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twentieth century, the Supreme Court began to recognize a
distinction between the “mere abstract teaching” of the need for
lawlessness or violence and the actual preparing or exhorting of a
126
group into violent or unlawful action. Brandenburg v. Ohio held that
the government could not “forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
127
produce such action.”
Brandenburg’s holding, rendering such
advocacy unprotected only in the face of the dire societal costs arising
from imminent lawlessness, at least implicitly acknowledged the value
of expression advocating unlawful activities or civil disobedience,
which is, of course, a uniquely powerful communicative message.
Based on its contemporary understanding of the benefits and costs of
such advocacy, the Supreme Court thus narrowed the historical scope
of this exclusion, just as it did for the fighting words, defamation, and
obscenity exclusions.
A more in-depth evaluation would uncover an analogous
progression in other excluded speech categories, but my purpose
here is not to provide a full historical treatment of all the categories
outside the First Amendment’s coverage, nor even to mark their
present boundaries with precision, matters deserving their own
separate treatment. Rather, my aims are to illustrate the modern
judicial constriction of the founding-era scope of utterances outside
constitutional expressive protections and to demonstrate that this
expansion of First Amendment coverage depended on contemporary
perspectives regarding the utility of such communications balanced
against their societal costs. This progressive expansion confirms that,
while a historical tradition is a necessary component of unprotected
speech categories, it is not sufficient. The lessons learned and
knowledge gained from the ongoing American experience may
propel the judiciary to extend First Amendment coverage to
historically uncovered expressive messages.
A linguistic communication thus falls within the First
Amendment’s scope unless excluded by both a longstanding,
ongoing historical tradition and the judiciary’s contemporary
valuation of relative benefits and costs, or unless, as discussed below,
the communication is attributed, for First Amendment purposes, to
against First Amendment challenge because “he contemplated the ultimate
realization of his ideal by the use of force or . . . his speeches were incitements to that
end” having a dangerous “tendency”).
126
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48 (citing prior cases).
127
Id. at 447.
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the government or the polity.
2. Government Speech and Other Attributions
First Amendment coverage typically extends beyond expression’s
originators to encompass publishers, distributors, disseminators, and
128
But a significant exception is that no private
even audiences.
individual or entity can seek protection under the First Amendment
129
when the speech at issue is attributed to the government or polity.
Unlike the categories of unprotected speech discussed in the
previous subsection, however, this exclusion has not been fully
integrated into Supreme Court doctrine. The Court’s approach to
date has been piecemeal, resolving the presented issues in each case
with undertheorized conclusions. Decisions during the last decade
are illustrative. The Court, without identifying or proposing any
unifying framework, held in separate cases that a legislator does not
exercise a personal First Amendment right when casting an official
130
vote, that a private group is not covered by the First Amendment
when requesting placement of a permanent monument in a city park
131
with other donated monuments, and that beef producers are not
covered by the First Amendment when objecting to compelled
assessments for disfavored government-sponsored promotional
132
advertising.
Yet such exclusions from the First Amendment’s scope are too
consequential to entrust to these offhanded appraisals. The Court in
these cases denied any First Amendment coverage. These denials
implicate the same concerns underlying Stevens’s rejection of a
“freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside
133
the scope of the First Amendment.”
Just as the First Amendment
forecloses creating new categorical exclusions “simply on the basis
134
that some speech is not worth it,” government immunity from First
Amendment challenges should not be based solely on ad hoc judicial
judgments regarding attributing expression. This is especially true
because the consequences of an imputed exclusion often exceed
128

See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (recognizing First
Amendment coverage for distribution and receipt of expression); Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (holding that the First Amendment covers
distribution as well as publication).
129
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–66 (2005).
130
Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2348–51 (2011).
131
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009).
132
Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–62.
133
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010).
134
Id. at 1585.
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those of a categorical exclusion, as the government may not regulate
a categorical exclusion based on the idea, viewpoint, or message
135
expressed, while such discrimination is typically permitted when
136
speech is attributed to the government. Since the ramifications are
at least as severe, if not more so, than for a categorical exclusion,
governmental attribution should require circumstances analogous to
those warranting a categorical exclusion. A speaker should thus only
be denied First Amendment coverage for linguistic communications
in situations corresponding with historical traditions and continued
contemporary insights regarding the appropriate attribution of the
communication in light of the communicative interests at stake and
the availability of alternative channels of communication.
This structure reconciles the Supreme Court’s holdings and
integrates aspects of its decisional rationales. Take Nevada Commission
on Ethics v. Carrigan, which held that legislative recusal rules are not
subject to First Amendment challenge because a legislative vote is not
137
a personal expressive right of a legislator. In reaching this holding,
the Court first highlighted that courts had not previously invalidated
any generally applicable legislative recusal rules despite their
138
widespread use in America since the founding.
This tradition
established, according to the Court, that recusal rules do not touch
upon covered First Amendment speech “because such laws existed in
139
1791 and have been in place ever since.”
The Court viewed this
historical tradition as comporting with the principle that a legislative
vote is an apportionment of legislative power from the people rather
140
than the expression of an individual legislator.
In regards to its
expressive value, the Court reasoned, a legislative vote “symbolizes
nothing. It discloses . . . that the legislator wishes (for whatever
reason) that the proposition on the floor be adopted, just as a
physical assault discloses that the attacker dislikes the victim. But
141
neither the one nor the other is an act of communication.”
Plus,

135

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1992).
See, e.g., Summum, 555 U.S. at 467–68.
137
Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2011).
138
Id. at 2347–48. The House of Representatives adopted its legislative recusal
rule on April 7, 1789, 1 Annals of Cong. 98–99 (1789), and the Senate adopted its
rule in 1801. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE
OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 31 (1801). The Court also detailed that the
states likewise had a longstanding tradition of recusal rules. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at
2349.
139
Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2348.
140
Id. at 2350.
141
Id.
136
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the Court continued, even when a personal message exists, the
legislator has no First Amendment right to use the government
142
Carrigan thereby evaluated
mechanics of voting to convey it.
historical traditions, the utterance’s ascribed source, and the
communicative interests at stake in holding that the typically
linguistic act of legislative voting was not First Amendment covered
expression attributable to a legislator.
Carrigan’s solitary shortcoming was describing legislative voting
143
as a “nonsymbolic act” or “nonsymbolic conduct,” rather than
viewing the frequently linguistic element involved—stating “aye” or
“nay” or recording an “aye” or “nay” in the printed records—as
144
implicating “speech.” The potential pitfalls of dismissing spoken or
145
printed words as merely “conduct” are well documented. Carrigan
had no need to navigate this perilous terrain; indeed, the Court’s
foray leaves troublesome issues regarding expressive coverage for
other types of voting or linguistic utterances with legislative
146
consequences.
A preferable approach would have been to begin
with the presumptive First Amendment coverage for linguistic
communications, but then exclude legislative voting based on both
142

Id. at 2351.
Id. at 2350–51.
144
See id. at 2354 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The Court’s strange understanding of
the concept of speech is shown by its suggestion that the symbolic act of burning the
flag is speech but John Quincy Adams calling out ‘yea’ on the Embargo Act was
not.”).
145
See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. ILL.
L. REV. 881, 906 (“[S]imply labeling speech ‘conduct’ is an analytical nonstarter.”);
Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 110 (1989) (arguing attempt to distinguish
between speech and conduct is “doomed to failure”); Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a
Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 SW. U. L. REV. 237, 242 (1978) (viewing the survival of the
“empty speech-conduct distinction . . . in a world without extrasensory
communication” as a “mystery”); William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free
Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107, 114 (1982) (urging “one should not take recourse
to verbal subterfuge, e.g., that it is ‘speech-brigaded-with-action’ or ‘conduct’ alone
that is curtailed” when a verbal utterance is regulated); Eugene Volokh, Speech as
Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering
Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1284–85, 1347–48
(2005) [hereinafter Volokh, Speech as Conduct] (arguing that speech as conduct
doctrines “require courts to focus on the wrong questions, and would often lead
courts . . . to reach the wrong results”). But see KENT GREENWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND
THE USES OF LANGUAGE 57–58 (1989) (maintaining that limited kinds of speech
involve “situation-altering utterances” not covered by the First Amendment).
146
See Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2354 (Alito, J., concurring). Such issues, though, may
not be troubling to Carrigan’s author, Justice Scalia, who believes that linguistic
legislative acts are not covered by the First Amendment. See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct.
2811, 2832 (Scalia, J., concurring).
143
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(1) the ongoing historical tradition of attributing the legislative
power to the constituency and (2) the contemporary understandings
that the communicative aspect of a vote is minimal to both the
legislator and the intended audience and that ample alternative
methods exist to convey any desired message.
A similar analysis also harmonizes the Court’s government
speech cases. The current doctrinal significance of government
speech is not creating a free speech right that the government can
147
assert against itself, but instead providing the government a defense
to a First Amendment claim when the particular forum or
communicative avenue a person is attempting to access has been
148
reserved for the government’s use. In other words, the government
speech doctrine treats a specified communicative forum as reserved
for the government’s transmission of messages, precluding the
putative speaker from employing that channel to transmit speech that
would otherwise fall within the First Amendment. And while the
Court has been obtuse in defining the contours of government
149
speech other than discussing the need for government control, the
decisions often highlight both historical traditions and the interests
of speakers and audiences.
Consider Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, which held that the
government could choose to accept or reject privately donated
permanent monuments for exhibition in a public park without any
150
scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.
This result effectively
147

See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government
Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1501–08 (2001) (detailing the textual, historical, and
prudential arguments against the government being a First Amendment rights
holder). But see David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 1637, 1640–41 (2006) (contending that in some situations a public entity should
have constitutional protection for its speech).
148
See Randall P. Bezanson, The Government Speech Forum: Forbes and Finley and
Government Speech Selection Judgments, 83 IOWA L. REV. 953, 956 (1998) (highlighting
that the government’s own speech may limit the freedom of others to speak under
the idea of a “government speech forum”); Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and
Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 708 (2011) [hereinafter Blocher, Viewpoint
Neutrality] (“[G]overnment speech doctrine provides a defense to First Amendment
challenges brought by private individuals whose speech has been limited by the
government”).
149
See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (contending that the Court’s government speech doctrine is “relatively
new, and correspondingly imprecise”).
150
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009). The rejected
monument was a stone inscribed with the tenets of the Summum religion, the Seven
Aphorisms of Summum. Id. at 465. Because the linguistic elements in the
monument served an essential expressive purpose, this monument can be classified
as linguistic, even though many monuments are nonlinguistic. See infra Part II.B.
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grants public officials unfettered discretion to display only those
monuments comporting with their preferences and favored themes
(unless doing so violates another constitutional prohibition, such as
the Establishment Clause). To support its holding, the Court began
with the longstanding practice, dating back to ancient times, of
151
governments expressing messages or beliefs through monuments.
Throughout American history, government entities have selectively
received and exhibited thousands of privately funded or donated
monuments, while retaining editorial control over their content and
152
public display.
The city in this case had exercised such selective
control, accepting only those privately donated monuments
153
As a result, the
comporting with the image it desired to project.
Court determined that the city had “‘effectively controlled’ the
messages conveyed by the monuments in the park by exercising ‘final
154
approval authority’ over their selection.”
In the course of this discussion, the Court highlighted several
additional considerations.
Observers, the Court reasoned,
“routinely” and “reasonably” interpret monuments as expressing a
message on behalf of a property owner (whether private or public),
indicating that the property owner is viewed as “speaking” through
155
the monument. The Court further noticed the financial benefit the
government (and its citizens) obtain by accepting privately funded or
156
donated monuments rather than relying on public financing, as
well as the practical necessity for government selectivity to avert a
157
“monumental” inundation of public property.
And the city’s
regulation at issue was limited to this need, the Court observed,
158
without inhibiting other protected expressive activities in the park.
These considerations fit comfortably within a framework based
on historical traditions and contemporary communicative impact.
An ongoing historical tradition exists of governments selectively
choosing monuments to display on public property, a tradition never
successfully challenged on free speech grounds. The historical
151

Summum, 555 U.S. at 470.
Id. at 471–72.
153
Id. at 472–73. The city had also established criteria for future selections of
monuments and obtained ownership of most of the monuments in the park. Id.
154
Id. (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–61).
155
Id. at 471.
156
Id.
157
See Summum, 555 U.S. at 479–80.
158
Id. at 474 (“And the City has made no effort to abridge the traditional free
speech rights—the right to speak, distribute leaflets, etc.—that may be exercised by
respondent and others in Pioneer Park.”).
152
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understanding that the government is “speaking” when the
monument is on public property comports with the contemporary
perspectives of the modern observer and the government’s need to
manage public property while being able to continue this timehonored form of government expression. Public property cannot
provide a forum for the permanent display of every privately donated
159
monument.
And speakers, such as the Summum, have numerous
other methods to transmit their expression to their intended
audiences without employing this traditionally exclusive government
forum. Summum’s holding that the public display of privately
donated monuments is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny thus
corresponds with historical traditions and continued contemporary
insights regarding the appropriate attribution of the monument’s
expression in light of the communicative interests at stake and the
availability of alternative channels of communication.
Summum’s stated rationale, however, also emphasized a
problematic construct.
While the Court acknowledged the
“legitimate concern” that the government speech doctrine should not
be employed “as a subterfuge for favoring certain private speakers
over others based on viewpoint,” its focus on the government’s
160
control of the message did nothing to alleviate it.
An ad hoc
judgment regarding the government’s “control” over a particular
message is no more constraining than an ad hoc judgment on the
161
value of speech in light of its associated harms.
If control is the
only criterion, why couldn’t the government assert the necessary
control over public libraries to remove materials based on
162
163
viewpoint, over public broadcasting stations to ban editorializing,
over public university student groups to bar any objectionable

159

Cf. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 811 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (recounting the battle over symbols when the capitol
grounds in Ohio were opened to temporary monuments during the holiday season).
160
Summum, 555 U.S. at 472–73. While I agree with Professor Blocher that the
government speech doctrine by its very nature “encourages government to be open,
consistent, and sincere” in favoring certain private speakers over others, I view the
Court’s expressed concern as focused on the doctrine’s scope. See Blocher, supra
note 148 at 717.
161
See United States v. Stevens, 599 U.S. 460, 469–72 (2010).
162
But see Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870–72 (1982) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that books could not be removed from a school library due to partisan
or ideological ideas).
163
But see FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399–401 (1984)
(holding ban on editorializing on publicly funded television stations
unconstitutional).
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164

perspectives,
over public university professors to prohibit
165
over government-funded attorneys to
unorthodox viewpoints,
166
preclude specified arguments from being presented in court, or
over nongovernmental organizations participating in a federal
167
program to compel their pledges to support government policies?
Indeed, as the government stressed in Summum, control as the
criterion would generally authorize the government, once it “takes
control of something, says this is our speech,” to be immune from
168
judicial scrutiny because “then it’s the Government speaking.”
Yet a needed constraint would exist by further limiting the
government speech doctrine to traditional situations in which the
government has expressed itself without providing an opportunity for
contrary viewpoints. This historical prerequisite would preclude the
government from attempting to assert control over existing mediums
of communication to immunize itself from compliance with First
169
Amendment limitations.
Government speech, then, could not be
extended to venues traditionally open to a variety of viewpoints, such
as government public forums, the U.S. Postal Service, public
broadcast editorials, publicly funded adversarial advocacy, or public
170
university student groups.
In these traditional “domains of public
discourse,” the government’s asserted control, even over those
receiving subsidies or other government benefits, would not allow the
164

But see Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187–88 (1972) (holding that a public
university could not deny school affiliation to a student group because the school
found “the views expressed by [the] group to be abhorrent”).
165
But see Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (recognizing that a university
is a “traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our
society” that First Amendment freedoms limit the government’s ability to constrain
speech); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (holding that the First
Amendment “does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom”).
166
But see Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 531, 533, 547–49 (2001)
(invalidating a funding condition that prohibited attorney recipients from
addressing the validity of welfare laws).
167
But see Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2321, 2332 (2013) (invalidating a funding condition requiring affirmation of a belief
outside the government program’s scope).
168
Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S.
460 (2009) (No. 07-665).
169
Cf. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543 (“Where the government uses or attempts to
regulate a particular medium, we have been informed by its accepted usage in
determining whether a particular restriction on speech is necessary for the
program’s purposes and limitations.”).
170
Cf. Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Speech, Subsidies, and Traditions: AID v. AOSI
and the First Amendment, 2012–13 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 363, 381–88 (highlighting the
importance of such venues to expressive freedoms).
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government to dispense with typical First Amendment protections.
Instead, only in cases of a historic “baseline,” in which the
government has traditionally asserted control over the expression at
issue to accomplish government objectives, could the government
172
speech doctrine potentially bar a First Amendment challenge.
The Court’s prior holdings attributing speech to the
government could all be defended under this requirement. The
government traditionally has, for example, exercised managerial
control over its employees and those compensated to engage in a
government-funded enterprise to project certain messages to the
populace. The government’s authority to control the expression of
its employees to ensure the accomplishment of government
objectives has long been recognized by the judiciary (despite the
controversy regarding the contemporary boundaries of such
173
authority).
Moreover, public entities have enacted conditions on
funding allocations since the founding of our nation to ensure the
achievement of prescribed directives, including in fields such as
174
public health.
171

See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 157–58 (1996)
(explaining that government funding is not determinative of First Amendment
protection when the speech is within “the domain of public discourse”). Dean Post
envisions identifying public discourse domains through case-by-case “complex and
contextual normative judgments” regarding social characterization, instead of a
traditional account supplemented by contemporary imputation insights considering
communicative utility and available alternative channels. See id. at 152. Although his
account offers additional flexibility and contextual nuance, the results should not
differ significantly, as American historical traditions and contemporary insights
presumably would often encompass the relevant social characterizations.
172
Cf. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1359–63 (1984) (discussing the use of history as
a baseline in ascertaining allocation sanctions).
173
See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517–18 (Mass. 1892)
(Holmes, J.) (holding that the government may constitutionally impose reasonable
conditions on its employees, including preventing police officers from soliciting
money for or being a member of a political committee). While McAuliffe’s broad
dictum that a government employee “may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a [public employee]” has been disavowed, see
generally O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 716–17 (1996),
the government still retains the authority to regulate employee speech to ensure the
efficient promotion of its public mission. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422–
23 (2006). For commentary on public employee speech rights, see Helen Norton,
Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its
Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1 (2009); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee Free
Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
1173 (2007); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial
Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (2008); George Rutherglen, Public Employee Speech
in Remedial Perspective, 24 J.L. & POL. 129 (2008).
174
See, e.g., Act for the Relief of Sick and Disabled Seamen, 1 Stat. 605 (July 16,
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The funding conditions challenged in Rust v. Sullivan thus fell
within a longstanding tradition authorizing the government to
ascertain the scope of publicly funded health projects, at least to the
extent the family planning projects were limited to preconception
175
counseling (rather than post-conception services).
The more
difficult issue in Rust involved the extension of the regulations to
prohibit physicians in the project from delivering abortion-related
176
advice, even upon specific request. Although government funding
for specifically defined public health services extends back to before
177
the Revolution, there is no indication that such programs ever
limited physicians’ advice to patients. Moreover, in light of the
nature of the physician-patient relationship and the practical
obstacles to alternative communicative channels, attributing
physicians’ speech to the government appears problematic. Yet Rust
did respond to some of these concerns. The Court reasoned that the
regulations did not “significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient
relationship” because the patient had no justifiable expectation of
receiving comprehensive medical advice in light of the limited nature
178
of the program.
The regulations also only precluded abortion
counseling as a method of family planning, thereby allowing abortion
179
referral or counseling when medically necessary. Other avenues to
disseminate the message existed, as the health care organization
receiving the funds could still provide abortion counseling and even
abortion services—it just had to do so through programs separate
180
and independent from the funded project.
The Court therefore
held (while leaving open the potential of a different result for more
significant intrusions on physicians’ advice) that the government was
free to bar funding recipients from counseling abortion and to
convey its own undistorted message preferring childbirth.
1798) (establishing tax on seamen entering into American ports to be used by the
President to provide for temporary relief of sick or disabled seamen either at existing
marine hospitals or “in such other manner as he shall direct” and under his “general
instructions”). In smaller communities, the “hospital” consisted of contracted local
physicians working in private boarding residences, who were obligated to abide by
the program’s “instructions” regarding qualifying seamen, permissible stay lengths,
and treatable conditions. See Gautham Rao, Sailors’ Health and National Wealth, 9
Common-place (Oct. 2008) (available at http:// http://www.common-place.org/vol09/no-01/rao/www/common-place.org/vol-09/no-01/).
175
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 179–80, 192–200 (1991).
176
Id. at 180.
177
See STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH & MICHAEL A. LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE: THE
WELFARE STATE IN THE AGE OF CONTRACTING 47–48 (1993).
178
Rust, 500 U.S. at 200.
179
Id. at 195.
180
Id. at 196.
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The government likewise may engage in promotional advertising
to serve public interests.
A longstanding tradition supports
government advertising; indeed, the success of national government
bond sales made through newspaper advertisements during the Civil
War has been credited with exhibiting advertising’s power, which
launched other national ad campaigns and eventually the advertising
181
industry.
Many government-sponsored advertisement campaigns
have become iconic, including Uncle Sam’s “I Want You for U.S.
182
Army” and Smokey the Bear’s “Only You Can Prevent Forest Fires.”
Historical traditions thus underlie the Court’s holding in Johanns v.
Livestock Marketing Association that the government can direct a
promotional advertising campaign (there, promoting beef
consumption) to further objectives believed to be in the public
183
interest.
The debatable aspect of Johanns is whether the
government must be transparent in its involvement—rather than
attributing the advertisements to “America’s Beef Producers”—to
184
ensure the government’s accountability for the message. But there
is little doubt that the government, as a general matter, can use tax
dollars from its citizens (or from some portion of its citizens) to fund
promotional advertisements supporting objectives believed to be in
the public interest (even over the contrary views of taxed objectors)
under both historical traditions and contemporary attribution
principles.
Of course, a traditions-based approach supplemented with
attribution considerations will not always generate untroublesome
solutions. Properly identifying the relevant tradition often is not a
simple task. For instance, in a public university setting, different
relevant traditions exist. Government viewpoint discrimination
181

See CHARLES A. GOODRUM & HELEN DALRYMPLE, ADVERTISING IN AMERICA: THE
FIRST TWO HUNDRED YEARS 35 (2006).
182
See id. at 158, 268.
183
Johanns v. Livestock, Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–65 (2005).
184
Compare id. at 564 n.7 (concluding “no prior practice, no precedent, and no
authority [exists] for this highly refined elaboration”), with id. at 571 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the government “must make itself politically accountable by
indicating that the content actually is a government message”). My preliminary
research indicates that the majority appears correct in its assertion that there has not
been a uniform “prior practice” or any precedent requiring governmental
transparency for its promotional advertisements. See id. at 564 n.7 (majority
opinion). This should not end the matter, though, as such transparency might be
necessary for correct attribution under contemporary standards. For persuasive
arguments that the Court erred by not mandating transparency, see Gia B. Lee,
Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 988 (2005);
Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U.
L. REV. 587, 597 (2008).
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regarding student advocacy groups and the pursuit of intellectual
185
freedom is taboo, but government control over other aspects of the
university, such as educational content and resource allocation, is
186
common.
A particular expressive undertaking by a university thus
must be categorized into the appropriate traditional analogue. And
such refined classifications will be necessary in other contexts as well
to discern the appropriate tradition. Yet this is an inherent difficulty
in all historical analyses, including those necessary for categorical
187
exclusions after Stevens.
Another wrinkle is that some government speech situations may
address relevant “traditions” of relatively recent vintage. New forms
or avenues of communication—and potentially government speech—
188
are constantly emerging.
Even the longstanding traditions
discussed previously regarding public universities and government
advertisements are not traceable to the founding era, as such
communicative avenues did not exist at that time in their present
form. This means that the “tradition” in government speech cases
may not always be a long one. If the government creates a new
particular avenue of communication, the government should be
allowed to assert control over that forum from its inception and
preclude contrary viewpoints, assuming that the attribution of the
speech appears appropriate and the government is not unduly
189
abridging valuable communicative outlets.
While a full account of the government speech doctrine is not
feasible here, this overview demonstrates that the existing precedents
are compatible with a structural framework considering traditions
and relative worth. Admittedly, in this context, the framework is
prescriptive, not merely descriptive. But the prescription comports
185

See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187–88 (1972); Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
186
See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833
(1995).
187
See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544–47 (2012) (plurality
opinion) (finding no historical warrant for a categorical exception from First
Amendment coverage for false statements despite dissent’s contrary view); Brown v.
Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2735–36 n.3 (2011) (holding historical
traditions did not support an exception for violence directed at minors despite
dissent’s contrary argument).
188
See Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U.
L. REV. 899, 900–03 (2010) (highlighting government’s use of emerging expressive
technologies).
189
Cf. Mary Jean Dolan, The Special Public Purpose Forum and Endorsement
Relationships: New Extensions of Government Speech, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 111–18
(2004) (contending the government should be able to discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint when creating a “special public purpose forum”).
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with the Supreme Court’s holdings and the considerations frequently
employed to resolve such cases. And such a framework brings
symmetry to the Court’s treatment of both categorical and
attributional exclusions to First Amendment coverage. No persuasive
justification exists for a more stringent approach for categorical
exclusions when imputed exclusions often allow the government to
190
violate the cardinal principle against viewpoint discrimination. As a
result, both exceptions to the presumption of First Amendment
coverage for linguistic communications depend on traditions and
contemporary valuations.

B. Coverage Presumptions for Nonlinguistic Expressive Conduct
The remaining issue is ascertaining First Amendment coverage
for those forms of conduct or action that are nonlinguistic in nature
yet nevertheless may convey some message. The Court has long
recognized that some forms of conduct must be within the scope of
191
the First Amendment, even though lesser protection is afforded to
192
expressive conduct’s nonspeech aspects.
Yet the Court has never
proposed “a fully satisfactory test for demarcating speech from
193
The dilemma is defining when the
noncommunicative conduct.”
“kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes”
burgeons sufficiently “to bring the activity within the protection of
194
the First Amendment.” The Court has vacillated on the basic issue
of whether the conduct must convey a particularized message,
holding a particularized message is necessary for speech coverage in

190

Compare Blocher, supra note 54, at 717 (discussing “the many ways in which
government speech [often] discriminates against private viewpoints”), with R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) (“The government may not regulate . . .
based on hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed.”).
191
See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369–70 (1931) (invalidating statute
criminalizing displaying a red flag to oppose organized government on free speech
grounds).
192
See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (assuming burning
a draft card was “sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not
necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally
protected activity”).
193
Tiersma, supra note 12, at 1531; accord Dale Carpenter, Unanimously Wrong,
2005–06 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 217, 241 (“The Court has never had a satisfying theory
of what conduct should get free-speech protection.”); James M. McGoldrick, Jr.,
Symbolic Speech: A Message from Mind to Mind, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2008)
(recognizing the difficulty in ascertaining “why some expressive conduct is speech
and why other expressive conduct is not”).
194
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
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196

some situations, but not in others.
Yet instead of confronting
197
these discrepancies, the Court typically ignores them.
This reticence is unnecessary, though, because the Court’s
holdings are reconcilable. The key, again, is historical traditions. For
conduct that has been viewed as predominantly expressive since the
founding, the Court applies the First Amendment regardless of the
198
conveyance of a particularized message.
On the other hand, for
contemporary nonlinguistic communicative acts and those involving
conduct which is expressive only in certain circumstances, the Court
undertakes a more searching evaluation requiring an understandable
199
message.
1. Presumptive Coverage for Traditional Forms
Some forms of conduct have been understood to be exclusively
or at least predominantly expressive and within the ambit of speech
and press guarantees since the birth of our nation. Parades, marches,
music, art, monuments, certain displays of symbols, and even
campaign contributions were protected means of conveying ideas,
emotions, messages, and political beliefs at the founding. With
respect to these predominantly expressive traditional forms, the
Supreme Court has never required a particularized message for First
Amendment coverage.
Marches, parades, processions, demonstrations, festivals, and
other public gatherings for political and civic purposes were frequent
200
events from the earliest days of America.
Such events often
195

See, e.g., Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2011)
(concluding that “the act of voting symbolizes nothing”); Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64–66 (2006) (holding conduct of
excluding or affording differential treatment to military recruiters not inherently
expressive).
196
See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 476–77 (2009) (holding
acceptance of donated monuments expressive even though “it frequently is not
possible to identify a single ‘message’ that is conveyed by an object or structure”);
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995) (determining that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition
of constitutional protection”).
197
Cf. Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 1, at 1767.
198
See infra Part II.B.1.
199
See infra Part II.B.2.
200
See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV.
543, 554–61 (2009) (discussing centrality of such public gatherings to founding-era
democratic politics); SIMON P. NEWMAN, PARADES AND POLITICS OF THE STREET: FESTIVE
CULTURE IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 2 (1997) (highlighting the
“extraordinarily diverse array” of parades and festivals in early America); MARY P.
RYAN, CIVIC WARS: DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC LIFE IN THE AMERICAN CITY DURING THE
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included music, songs, flags, effigies, and other symbols to represent
201
These parades and marches were
allegiances and sympathies.
neither prohibited nor regulated during the founding era, unless
degenerating sufficiently to implicate criminal law prohibitions
against breaching the peace, public disturbance, public nuisance,
202
libel, or slander.
Modern Supreme Court decisions all recognize that parading
and marching are covered by the First Amendment, even if a
203
particularized message is not conveyed. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. explained that parades are “a
form of expression, not just motion,” with “the inherent
expressiveness of marching to make a point” underscoring the
Court’s longstanding precedent affording constitutional protection
204
to protest marches. Parades and marches, the Court confirmed, do
not need to be distilled to a “narrow, succinctly articulable message”
to qualify for the First Amendment’s shield; constitutional coverage
exists as long as there is any reason (or a multitude of reasons) for
the group’s movement over merely reaching a particular
205
destination.
To support this proposition, Hurley observed that prior
precedents had extended First Amendment coverage to displaying
flags and saluting (or refusing to salute) flags, acts which also might
206
not convey a succinct and particularized message. Like parades and
marches, displaying, waving, and saluting flags were common forms
NINETEENTH CENTURY 58–131 (1997) (describing numerous nineteenth century
examples).
201
See NEWMAN, supra note 200, at 1–2, 98–99; Volokh, Symbolic Expression, supra
note 24, at 1060–62.
202
See Abu El-Haj, supra note 200, at 562; Volokh, Symbolic Expression, supra note
24, at 1067–68.
203
See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 568–70 (1995) (discussing First Amendment protection for parades and
marches even if a “narrow, succinctly articulable message” is not present); Gregory v.
Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112 (1969) (holding peaceful march to protest segregation
“falls well within the sphere of conduct protected by the First Amendment”); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545–46 (1965) (holding peaceful assembly, march, singing,
and protest against racial segregation protected by speech and assembly guarantees);
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (determining protest march
with placards and songs “reflect[ed] an exercise of [First Amendment] basic
constitutional rights in their most pristine and classic form”).
204
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568.
205
Id. at 568–69. The Court continued: “Not many marches, then, are beyond the
realm of expressive parades, and the South Boston celebration is not one of them,”
with its cadre of spectators, costumes, flags, banners, music, and floats. Id. at 569.
206
See id. (citing W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632, 642 (1943);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
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of expression during the founding era. As the Supreme Court noted
in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the act of refusing
to salute a flag is “an old one, well known to the framers of the Bill of
207
Rights.”
This long-standing history could explain the Court’s
failure to mention whether First Amendment coverage extended to
displaying a flag in its first case invalidating a statute on free speech
208
grounds, Stromberg v. California.
Even though Ms. Stromberg’s
conviction was based on displaying a “red flag” used as “a sign, symbol
or emblem of opposition to organized government,” the Court never
discussed the necessary coverage prerequisite for holding flag
209
displays protected by freedom of speech.
Rather, the Court
apparently viewed this aspect of the First Amendment’s coverage as
self-evident, which was warranted in light of the longstanding
historical traditions of our nation. Other traditional symbols likewise
have received presumptive First Amendment coverage, including
students wearing black armbands (a sign of mourning since the
210
211
Revolutionary period ) to oppose a war.
The Court has similarly treated First Amendment coverage for
nonlinguistic arts (such as instrumental music, painting, sculptures,
and performance dance) as a largely self-evident proposition,
212
irrespective of the comprehensibility of any message conveyed.
207

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633.
Stromburg, 283 U.S. at 369.
209
Id. at 369–70.
210
See MARY CABLE, AMERICAN MANNERS AND MORALS 45 (1969). Since that time,
black armbands have been used as a symbol of “mourning” in demonstrations and
protests. See, e.g., David M. Rabban, The IWW Free Speech Fights and Popular Conceptions
of Free Expression Before World War I, 80 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1101 (1994) (discussing black
armbands used by IWW picketers).
211
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 399 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969).
The Court summarily concluded without analysis that “the wearing of armbands in
the circumstances of this case was entirely divorced from actually or potentially
disruptive conduct” and was “closely akin to ‘pure speech’” that “is entitled to
comprehensive protection under the First Amendment.” Id.
212
See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 474–77 (2009)
(reasoning the acceptance of a monument is expressive conduct although “it is
frequently not possible to identify a single ‘message’ that is conveyed by an object or
structure”); Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 (discussing the “unquestionably shielded painting
of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis
Carroll”); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (“Music, as a form
of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment.”);
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (concluding nude
dancing as a form of live entertainment “is not without its First Amendment
protections from official regulation”); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119–20
(1973) (recognizing that paintings, drawings, and engravings are protected by the
First Amendment unless falling within an unprotected category of expression);
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 117–18 (1972) (discussing expressive protections
208
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Many of these cases have highlighted the ancient historical roots of
213
such forms of expression. The American Revolutionary generation
214
viewed expressive guarantees as protecting the “arts in general,”
and one of the earliest American state court cases regarding
constitutional expressive freedoms equated the protections afforded
215
to paintings to that afforded to books.
The arts have thus been
included in the American conception of free expression since our
beginnings.
Even First Amendment coverage for campaign contributions
comports with founding historical traditions, as contributions to
campaigns and political parties have been a part of the American
216
political system since our nation’s creation. The first congressional
attempts to regulate contributions made through “assessments” on
government employees were defeated in the first part of the
nineteenth century, with opponents primarily arguing that the
217
proposed bills violated the First Amendment. The Supreme Court
eventually confirmed that campaign contributions are covered by the
afforded to a “scantily clad ballet troupe”).
213
See, e.g., Summum, 555 U.S. at 470–72 (discussing ancient history of
communication through monuments); Ward, 491 U.S. at 790 (“Music is one of the
oldest forms of human expression.”). Cf. Miller v. City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081,
1089–90 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring) (tracing public
performances by erotic dancers to ancient Greeks), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
214
1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (1774).
215
Brandreth v. Lane, 8 Paige Ch. 24, 26–27 (N.Y Ch. 1839) (concluding liberty of
the press applied to both an earlier case involving a painting and the case before it
involving a book because both situations were “of the like nature”).
216
See Robert E. Mutch, The First Federal Campaign Finance Bills, 14 J. POL’Y HIST. 30,
30–45 (2002). At the founding, the societal-elite candidate, his relatives, and his
friends paid the expenses incurred in seeking elective office. Id. at 39. But the early
nineteenth century witnessed a transition from this colonial political remnant to a
more democratic system, which necessitated campaign contributions on a broader
scale. Id. at 30. Early nineteenth century campaign contributions were first made by
party members before a practice began around 1830 to “assess” the salaries of
government employees for the support of their party’s political affairs. See id. at 30,
45.
217
See id. Congress considered several proposed bills between 1837 and 1841 to
prohibit assessments for political purposes on public employees, but none passed,
with opponents consistently contending that prohibiting campaign contributions
violated freedom of speech. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 25th CONG., 3d sess., Appendix
157 (1839) (statement of Rep. Isaac Crary) (“It is a bill to circumscribe freedom of
speech and action. . . . it violates the constitution.”); id. at 204 (statement of Sen.
James Buchanan) (“This bill is a gag law. . . . The Constitution, in language so plain
as to leave no room for misconstruction, declares that, ‘Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech.’”). After the Civil War, however, the assessment
practice was outlawed by federal legislation. See, e.g., Pendleton Civil Service Reform
Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883).
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First Amendment without mentioning the need for a particularized
or specific message, similar to its treatment of all the other forms of
218
traditionally expressive conduct traceable to the founding.
The Court’s holdings thus confirm the centrality of historical
traditions to First Amendment coverage for intended expressive acts
(even when these traditions go unmentioned in the opinions).
Consider the contrast between coverage for campaign contributions
and the lack of coverage for legislative votes. Carrigan explained that
a legislative vote “symbolizes nothing. It discloses . . . that the
legislator wishes (for whatever reason) that the proposition on the
219
floor be adopted, [but it] is [not] an act of communication.” The
Court illustrated with colorful examples: how does a legislator
through a vote convey whether his or her position is based on
personal views, the views of constituents, the views of big contributors,
220
or the views of the party? Yet these exact same arguments could be
marshaled against the lack of an expressive element in campaign
contributions. A campaign donor may make the contribution for a
number of reasons, including overall support of the candidate, the
candidate’s view on a single issue, a desire to “buy influence” over the
candidate, a personal friendship with the candidate, pressure from
family, peer groups, the workplace, or a spiritual community, the
urging of a celebrity or media personality, or a host of other potential
reasons. The contribution itself “symbolizes nothing” other than the
individual “wishes (for whatever reason)” to give money to the
candidate—it does not even indicate that the individual desires the
candidate’s election, as some individuals contribute to opposing
221
campaigns. Yet the longstanding tradition of viewing contributions
to political campaigns as falling within the First Amendment’s
coverage obviates the need to establish that the particularized
message the Court deemed necessary for legislative voting exists in
218

See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (“A contribution serves as a general
expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the
underlying basis for the support.”).
219
Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2011).
220
See id.
221
See, e.g., Ali Weinberg, All Politics is Local: Colbert Busch Culls GOP Support from
Friends, FIRSTREAD ON NBCNEWS.COM (Mar. 21, 2013) available at:
http://firstread.nbcnews.com/news/2013/03/21/17403589-all-politics-is-local
-colbert-busch-culls-gop-support-from-friends?lite (discussing contributions to
opposing candidates for same office). It is also not uncommon in Texas for lawyers
or firms to contribute to opposing candidates in contested partisan state judicial
races. See CHARLES W. “ROCKY” RHODES, THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION IN STATE AND
NATION: COMPARATIVE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 130-34
(2014).
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the campaign contribution context. Without such a tradition,
though, establishing that actions in a nonlinguistic form are within
the First Amendment’s scope is a more formidable task.
2. Lesser Coverage for Nontraditional Forms
With respect to actions without a historical expressive pedigree
or that are only expressive under certain circumstances, the Court
has indicated that First Amendment coverage depends on whether
the conduct at issue is “inherently expressive,” demanding a more
222
particularized message without the aid of explanatory speech. This
223
requires more than merely an intent to convey a message, and more
224
than engaging in conduct containing some “kernel of expression.”
Rather, the conduct must be of a type that contemporary social
norms recognize as articulating an apparent message that can be
understood by observers.
The vast majority of our daily actions do not satisfy this standard.
For instance, a gathering at a commercial establishment to engage in
225
social recreational dancing is not covered by the First Amendment.
The differential treatment of military recruiters by law schools is also
not sufficiently expressive for First Amendment coverage because an
observer, according to the Court, could not ascertain (at least without
the aid of explanatory speech) whether such an action resulted from
disapproval of the military, the preferences of military recruiters, or
226
the capacity of the interview rooms at the law school.
The Court
has also indicated numerous other activities fall outside the First
Amendment’s coverage, such as refusing to pay income taxes as an
227
228
expression of disapproval of the IRS, being in a state of nudity,
222

See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S.
47, 66 (2006) (holding First Amendment coverage extends “only to conduct that is
inherently expressive” and viewing need for “explanatory speech” as “strong
evidence” against satisfying this standard); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404
(1989) (concluding First Amendment coverage for conduct depends on the intent
“to convey a particularized message” and the likelihood that observers would
understand the message); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–11 (1974)
(same).
223
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“We cannot accept the
view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever
the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”).
224
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (“It is possible to find some
kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes . . . but such a
kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First
Amendment.”).
225
Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 25.
226
Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66.
227
Id.
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230

committing assaults or acts of violence, using drugs, meeting with
231
232
friends at the mall, or walking down the street.
Yet sometimes this demanding standard is satisfied. Several
cases have either held or assumed that burning a recognized symbol
is covered by the First Amendment. Burning an item is a potential
method to express a succinct, articulable message—indeed, the
founding period was replete with instances of burning symbols (such
as effigies, flags, publications, or copies of laws) as a means of
233
expression.
But burning an item, unlike displaying a flag or
marching in a parade, is not a predominantly expressive activity. In
most instances, burning is simply a method to generate heat or
dispose of a worn or discarded item. As a result, burning is only
expressive conduct when performed with an intent to convey a
234
message that is likely to be understood by observers. This standard
has been satisfied in cases like Texas v. Johnson, which held that flag
burning as part of a political demonstration merited First
Amendment coverage because its expressive nature was “both
235
intentional and overwhelmingly apparent.”
Similarly, Virginia v.
Black acknowledged the First Amendment covers burning a cross, “an
236
effective and dramatic manner” of conveying a message of hate.
And the Court has also assumed that burning a draft card on the
steps of a federal courthouse implicated First Amendment coverage,
an assumption which appears inevitable in light of the clear intent to
convey a particularized message against the draft that was likely to be
237
understood (and indeed was) by onlookers.
Other uses of symbols likewise fall within the First Amendment’s
scope. Spence v. Washington extended First Amendment coverage to
the display of a flag with a peace sign affixed by removable tape, with
the Court reasoning that the combined symbolism was readily
238
understandable in light of recent national and world events.
In
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, the Court assumed
228

See City of Erie v. Pap’s AM, 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion).
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993); NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982).
230
See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
231
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
232
Id.
233
Volokh, Symbolic Expression, supra note 24, at 1060–62.
234
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404–06 (1989).
235
Id.. at 406; accord United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990).
236
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003).
237
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
238
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974).
229
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(without holding) that overnight sleeping in connection with a
demonstration to call attention to the plight of the homeless was
239
These
covered, at least to some extent, by the First Amendment.
cases illustrate that First Amendment coverage typically extends to
those actions involving symbols that have acquired a well-understood
social meaning in contemporary society, even when the action is not
predominantly expressive or the symbol is of recent origin.
The Court has also afforded First Amendment coverage to
predominantly expressive contemporary activities comparable to
traditional forms, such as picketing or sit-ins. Neither picketing nor
sit-ins—both of which involve congregating in a defined geographic
space to induce action by a targeted individual or entity—implicated
240
expressive freedoms at the founding.
Indeed, until almost the
middle of the twentieth century, such concerted actions often
241
violated common law or statutory prohibitions.
Only in 1940 did
the Supreme Court first afford constitutional protection to peaceful
labor picketing, viewing it as a “practical, effective means” to
“enlighten the public on the nature and causes of a labor dispute,” an
undertaking “essential to the securing of an informed and educated
242
public opinion with respect to a matter which is of public concern.”
The Court analogized engaging in expressive conduct at a public
locale near the employer to the historical use of the streets and
243
public spaces for other expressive activities.
While its subsequent
decisions have allowed the government to prohibit picketing targeted
239

Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
See Joseph Tanenhaus, Picketing as a Tort: The Development of the Law of Picketing
from 1880 to 1940, 14 U. PITT. L. REV. 170, 171–72 (1953) (discussing the two known
antebellum attempts by striking laborers to patrol their employers’ premises, both of
which resulted in indictments for conspiracy).
241
WILLIAM W. WIECEK, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941–1953 168–69 (Cambridge University Press 2006)
(discussing prohibitions on picketing and targeted actions during the nineteenth
and into the twentieth century). The courts viewed the term “picket” as indicating “a
militant purpose, inconsistent with peaceable persuasion.” Am. Steel Foundries v.
Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 205 (1921); accord Edgar A. Jones, Jr.,
Picketing and Coercion: A Jurisprudence of Epithets, 39 VA. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1953)
(describing the common law’s disdain for picketing). Despite some early twentieth
century state court decisions upholding peaceful picketing when allowed (or at least
not prohibited) by state statutory provisions, the Supreme Court held in 1921 that
verbally abusive (even if nonviolent) labor picketing deprived the business owner of
his property without due process of law, such that the Fourteenth Amendment
required its proscription. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 328 (1921); see id. at 364–
65 nn.28–31 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (listing conflicting existing state authorities on
picketing).
242
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940).
243
Id. at 106.
240
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outside the primary participants in a labor dispute, the Court
contemporaneously has extended constitutional coverage to
picketing or focused protests in numerous other contexts involving
245
issues of public concern.
Such cases recognize that, under
contemporary social norms and understandings, an organized
confinement to a defined geographic space may be an equally
expressive method to convey a public message as a group parade,
march, or other movement (even though both methods may be
246
regulated to prevent noncommunicative harms).
First Amendment coverage, then, is not limited to historical
forms of predominantly expressive conduct, but also includes
analogous contemporary forms of expressive conduct or modern
symbolism conveying a particularized message that is likely to be
244

See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Emp. Union, 447 U.S. 607, 616 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (concluding ban on picketing of secondary business imposed “no
impermissible restriction upon constitutionally protected speech”); Am. Radio Ass’n
v. Mobile Steamship Ass’n, 419 U.S. 215, 229–30 (1974) (upholding injunction
against American seamen picketing foreign-flag ships employing foreign crews); Int’l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951) (holding injunction against
secondary picketing “carries no unconstitutional abridgement of free speech”);
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498–502 (1949) (upholding
injunction against picketing to pressure company to stop selling ice to non-union ice
peddlers). The Court in these cases highlighted the coercive nature of picket lines
when labor discord expands outside the primary labor dispute. See, e.g., Retail Store,
447 U.S. at 616; Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498–502. While labor apparently has a First
Amendment right to engage in handbilling in the vicinity of a secondary dispute, the
Court has held that picketing, which it views as mixing communication and conduct,
may be banned in the same vicinity. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575–76, 580 (1988).
245
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218–19 (2011) (holding First
Amendment shielded funeral protesters from tort liability for emotional distress
when picketing at a public place on a matter of public concern); United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983) (holding peaceful picketing on sidewalks around
Supreme Court grounds covered by First Amendment); NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907–09 (1982) (holding nonviolent picketing
supporting boycott of white merchants to obtain equality was a form of First
Amendment conduct); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 459–61 (1980) (holding
prohibition on all non-labor peaceful picketing on the public streets and sidewalks in
residential neighborhoods infringed on protected expressive conduct); Police Dep’t
of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–99 (1972) (concluding ordinance precluding all
picketing within 150 feet of any school not involved in a labor dispute implicated
First Amendment); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (plurality opinion)
(concluding First Amendment embraces “appropriate types of action which certainly
include the right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest by silent and
reproachful presence, in a place where the protestant has every right to be”).
246
See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479–83 (1988) (holding that, although
public issue picketing on residential streets was covered by the First Amendment, an
ordinance banning focused picketing in front of a particular residence was a
constitutional time, place, and manner restriction).
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understood by observers. As with the exceptions to presumptive
constitutional coverage for linguistic communications highlighted
previously, contemporary perspectives regarding the relative utility of
the communicative thought conveyed thereby supplement historical
expressive traditions.
These oft-considered distinct inquiries—
determining when words are not covered by the First Amendment
and when expressive conduct is—thus share common underpinnings.
III. THE STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK
These shared underpinnings highlight the possibility of
constructing a unitary structural framework to account for the
Court’s coverage doctrine.
I will summarize the relevant
considerations, the resulting framework, and its normative
underpinnings first before applying it to test cases.
A. Historical Traditions and Contemporary Communicative Value
Words are not the sole component of the First Amendment’s
orbit. Rather, two parallel complications arise: (1) determining when
the spoken, printed, or written word is not covered by the First
Amendment; and (2) ascertaining when conduct without the use of
247
words is constitutionally covered.
In resolving these issues, the
Court’s touchstones are prior judicial acquiescence in historical
traditions and contemporary judicial insights on the value of the
speech in relationship to its harm. Other than the cases in which the
Court considered the coverage issue sufficiently self-evident to
proceed via ipse dixit, the Court always highlighted one—and
248
frequently both—of these considerations.
At the very minimum,
then, these considerations are key tools in ascertaining the First
Amendment’s scope.
These two considerations are also capable of constructing a First
Amendment architecture with systematic, ordered queries for
adjudicating coverage issues. Under this structure, easy cases remain
easy. While hard cases are still hard, the framework ensures the
appropriate issues are addressed, in accord with past doctrine, even
under vexing scenarios.
The first move is classifying the communicative attempt at issue
as linguistic or nonlinguistic. Linguistic communicative efforts
incorporate alphabetical usages of words or language—whether
247

See Schauer, Categories, supra note 11, at 268–73 (recognizing these two “parallel
problem[s]” of First Amendment coverage).
248
See supra Part II.
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spoken, printed, written, or otherwise conveyed by audio or visual
means (including sign language or Morse code). Such linguistic
efforts are presumptively covered by the First Amendment.
There are two exceptions that can rebut this coverage
presumption for linguistic expression, both of which consider
traditions and contemporary valuation. The first exception is socalled “unprotected” categories of utterances, such as incitement,
obscenity, fighting words, threats, fraud, and other “historic and
249
traditional categories long familiar to the bar.”
These uncovered
categories necessitate (1) an ongoing judicial acquiescence in laws
prohibiting or regulating analogous utterances dating back to the
founding, and (2) a continued contemporary evaluation that the
harms associated with that type of utterance exceed its relative
250
The second exception concerns expressive efforts
benefits.
251
attributed to the government or polity. This exception likewise has
two elements: (1) an ongoing judicial acquiescence in denying
expressive coverage to private speakers since the opening of that
communicative channel, and (2) a continued contemporary
evaluation that expressive coverage should be attributed to the
government or polity in light of the communicative interests at stake
252
and the availability of alternative communicative channels.
If
neither one of these two exceptions applies, the linguistic
253
communication falls within the First Amendment.
On the other hand, for communicative attempts without
linguistic elements, only those forms of predominantly
communicative conduct that the founders considered expressive
(such as parades, instrumental music, and art) are assumed to be
254
covered by the First Amendment.
When the relevant form of

249

United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2010) (quoting Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
250
See supra Part II.A.1.
251
See supra Part II.A.2.
252
See id.
253
Some dispute exists regarding whether these exceptions in fact predominate
over the rule. Cf. Weinstein, supra note 14, at 665–66. As Professor Weinstein
correctly notes, the Supreme Court’s prior enumerations of the unprotected
categories of speech do not appear to cover all the linguistic expression outside the
purview of the First Amendment. See id. But even accepting that there are additional
uncovered forms of expression, I still believe that substantially more linguistic
expression is covered than uncovered. I do not have empirical support for this belief
but can offer a thought experiment: is most of your own linguistic expression subject
to government regulation without implicating the First Amendment?
254
See supra Part II.B.1.
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conduct is of more recent origin, or involves an activity (such as
burning) that in most instances is not expressive, First Amendment
coverage necessitates that the undertaken conduct is inherently
expressive enough to convey a particularized message without the aid
255
of explanatory speech.
Those nonlinguistic communications
satisfying either the historical traditions or inherent expressiveness
standards are then subject to the same exceptions that exist for
linguistic communications—that is, historical categorical exclusions
256
and governmental attribution.
This means that historical considerations and communicative
utility are the dispositive considerations for both linguistic and
nonlinguistic
categorizations.
The
purpose
of
the
linguistic/nonlinguistic classification is not to dispense with these
concerns, but rather to establish the coverage presumption
employed.
Linguistic communications enjoy presumptive First
Amendment coverage unless excluded by both expressive traditions
and relative valuation. In other words (borrowed from Professor
Schauer), the Court adopts a broad coverage presumption for
linguistic communications and then “defines out” those subcategories
257
of utterances with an ongoing tradition of exclusion. With respect
to nonlinguistic communicative efforts, however, the Court “defines
in” First Amendment coverage for conduct based on either its
traditional or inherent expressiveness.
These converse presumptions allocate the risks of overinclusion
and underinclusion in defining the First Amendment’s scope. A
broad coverage presumption that defines out specified subcategories
258
tends to avoid errors of underinclusion.
This appears preferable
with respect to linguistic communications, which, as discussed earlier,
are the foremost concern of the expressive constitutional guarantees
259
under textual, historical, and doctrinal modalities.
Affording First
Amendment coverage to some words that should not be covered is a
tolerable risk; the danger is failing to afford protection to words that
should be covered, a threat which chills free expression and
squelches the breathing room necessary for its survival. The Court’s
doctrinal presumption in favor of linguistic coverage therefore

255

See supra Part II.B.2.
See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470–80 (2009); Virginia
v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973).
257
Cf. Schauer, Categories, supra note 11, at 280 (distinguishing between “defining
out” and “defining in” categorizations).
258
Id. at 281.
259
See supra Part II.
256
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appears appropriate.
The use of the contrary presumption for nonlinguistic acts also
appears preferable due to the dangers from overincluding conduct as
covered expression. Although most activities contain some “kernel of
expression,” not every action can implicate the First Amendment, at
least not without either significantly diluting First Amendment
protections or prohibiting government regulation of a wide swath of
260
activities.
As a result, the Court has been cautious in extending
First Amendment coverage to nonlinguistic conduct, especially in the
261
absence of a historical expressive pedigree.
The Court thus
appropriately employs historical traditions and expressive value to
“define in” coverage for nonlinguistic communications, while using
the same factors to “define out” coverage for linguistic
communications.
The combined operation of these presumptions ensures that all
expressive forms (whether linguistic or nonlinguistic) that fell within
the scope of expressive constitutional guarantees at the founding are
likewise covered today, irrespective of subsequent ad hoc judgments
that a particular form is not deserving of continued coverage. In this
manner, the First Amendment’s original public meaning, evidenced
through the legislative practices and judicial holdings at the
founding, serves as a baseline. This assures at least the continuation
of speech coverage existing in 1791, similar to the Court’s recent
holdings that the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment
establishes a minimum baseline for implicating constitutional
262
protections for searches and seizures.
This reliance on historical
practices reduces the risk that courts may conflate unpopular with
263
uncovered speech.
Yet while ongoing traditions and contemporary understandings
thus cannot diminish the First Amendment’s scope, they may (and
frequently do) occasion its expansion. Subsequent judicial holdings
and contemporary insights that additional forms hold relative
communicative value may justify their inclusion within the First
Amendment. We can thereby adhere to the original constitutional
compact and past experiences while allowing the amplification of
260

Cf. City of Dallas v. Stranglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
(assuming—but not holding—that camping in that case merited First Amendment
coverage).
262
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013); United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
263
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons from the
Twentieth Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273, 284 (2009) [hereinafter Stone, Lessons].
261
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expressive liberty as new philosophical and moral understandings are
integrated into the national consciousness.
This flexibility, however, sacrifices some predictability, especially
in cases around the edges. The contemporary ad hoc valuation of
the relative benefits and costs of traditionally uncovered expression
may not be evident. Even historical traditions are not always clear, as
well-documented difficulties arise in judicial historiography,
including the appropriate level of generality to establish the tradition
264
and courts’ selectivity bias in examining the historical record.
While I cannot resolve these complexities here, perhaps the level of
generality could be tailored to the tradition’s use, requiring more
specificity, for example, to exclude speech from coverage than
necessary for a coverage inclusion.
Selectivity bias might be
ameliorated to some extent by examining actual historical legislative
and judicial practices rather than searching for philosophical
understandings or original intentions. Of course, these suggestions
do not cure the potential of manipulation. Still, applying this
outlined structure provides more constraint than just naked ad hoc
balancing.
B. The Framework’s Application
The just-described framework can reconcile the apparent
265
contradictions highlighted in the beginning of Part I.
Take the
dichotomy between First Amendment coverage for campaign
contributions but not for legislative voting. While a campaign
contribution is nonlinguistic, it has been considered predominantly
266
expressive since the founding.
Contributions thus obtain the
benefit of presumed First Amendment coverage, subject only to
historical exclusions or governmental attribution, neither of which
apply. On the other hand, while a legislative vote is linguistic, the
presumption for First Amendment coverage is rebutted by attributing
the speech to the polity, in accord with longstanding traditions and
continued contemporary insights regarding the expressive value of a
vote and the ample availability of alternative communicative
267
channels.
Next consider divergent coverage for the commercial sale of
264

For classic treatments of these general issues, see A.H. Kelly, Clio and the Court:
An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119 and Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C.
Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990).
265
See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text.
266
See supra Part II.B.1.
267
See supra Part II.A.2.
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interactive violent video games and a law school’s refusal to allow
military recruiters on campus. Interactive video games contain
linguistic elements and therefore obtain presumptive constitutional
coverage.
Neither coverage exception applies, because no
longstanding tradition exists in this country of restricting children’s
access to depictions of violence or attributing the message to the
268
government.
Conversely, a refusal to allow military recruiters on
campus is nonlinguistic conduct that would require either a founding
tradition of treating the conduct as expression or apparent
expressiveness without accompanying explanatory speech. Because
no tradition exists of viewing a refusal to allow access as equivalent to
expression, and such an action is not inherently expressive, the First
269
Amendment is not implicated.
Other acknowledged but ill-defined First Amendment coverage
exceptions likewise comport with the outlined structure. Take, for
instance, the categorical exception the Court has recognized for
speech integral to criminal conduct. Although this category was
listed in United States v. Stevens as among the “well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
270
problem,” the uncertainty regarding its contours was apparent in
United States v. Alvarez, which addressed a constitutional challenge to
271
the Stolen Valor Act. The government asserted that this Act, which
criminalized false claims regarding military awards, could be
sustained under a categorical First Amendment coverage exception
for false factual statements. In order to establish a historical tradition
of exclusion for such factual misrepresentations, the government
provided several examples of proscriptions on false speech that the
courts have traditionally upheld, including statutes preventing false
representations of government authority or impersonating a
272
government officer.
The plurality, though, rejected the
government’s assertion that these examples established an
overarching exception for false factual statements, instead suggesting
that the examples implicated the existing exceptions for fraud and
273
for speech integral to criminal conduct. Yet the plurality failed to
268

Cf. Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734–35 (2011).
Cf. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47,
64–66 (2006).
270
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2010) (quoting Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)).
271
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
272
Id. at 2544–46 (plurality opinion).
273
Id. at 2546.
269
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offer any further discussion or even indicate which examples fell
under which exception, an understandable obfuscation considering
the Court’s prior precedent on this supposedly “well-defined”
274
category.
The Court first articulated a coverage exception for speech
275
integral to criminal conduct in Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co.
A union in that case, to induce nonunion retail ice peddlers to join,
sought agreements from wholesale ice distributors to stop selling ice
to nonunion peddlers, even though such agreements were illegal
276
restraints of trade under state law.
When Empire refused, the
union picketed; because union drivers refused to cross the picket
line, Empire lost eighty-five percent of its business before the
277
picketing was enjoined.
In upholding the injunction, the Court
held that the activities of the union, including “their powerful
transportation combination, their patrolling, their formation of a
picket line warning union men not to cross at peril of their union
memberships, [and] their publicizing,” all “constituted a single and
278
integrated course of conduct” violating state law.
The Court then
rejected the contention that constitutional coverage extended “to
speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a
279
valid criminal statute.”
Giboney’s scope, though, is susceptible to several potential
280
interpretations, and the Court’s subsequent applications of this
exception have not helped. The Court mentioned that distributing
and possessing child pornography were “integral part[s]” of the
illegal conduct of producing such materials in two cases holding child
281
pornography outside the First Amendment’s ambit.
Two other
274

See id. Neither the concurrence nor the dissent addressed speech integral to
criminal conduct. Justice Breyer’s concurrence employed intermediate scrutiny
rather than a categorical approach. Id. at 2551–54 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice
Alito’s dissent argued for a categorical exception for false factual statements. Id. at
2560–62 (Alito, J., dissenting).
275
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
276
Id. at 492.
277
Id. at 492–93.
278
Id. at 498.
279
Id.
280
See Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 145, at 1314–22 (discussing eight
different interpretations of Giboney and rejecting each one).
281
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1990) (upholding a ban on possessing
child pornography); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761–62 (1982) (upholding a
ban on distributing child pornography). As discussed in Part II.A.1, Ferber’s third (of
five) considerations in recognizing a categorical exclusion for child pornography was
that the market for child pornography was “an integral part of the [illegal]
production of such materials,” with the Court then quoting from Giboney as support.
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Court decisions held that offers to engage in illegal transactions are
not covered by the First Amendment, with one relying on Giboney as
282
But that has been the extent of the Court’s prior
support.
illumination.
Perhaps more guidance is possible by using the identified
coverage structure to evaluate the statutes discussed in Alvarez
criminalizing falsely representing government authority and
283
impersonating a government officer. As an initial matter, some of
the statutory proscriptions involve nonlinguistic conduct, such as
“act[ing]” as a government officer or employee, examples of which
could include seeking access to a restricted area or flashing a fake
284
badge. Such acts typically should not even obtain presumptive First
Amendment coverage—founding historical traditions would not
support the predominant expressiveness of the conduct, and such
acts would not be inherently expressive enough in most instances to
285
warrant First Amendment coverage.
Yet undoubtedly certain aspects of these prohibitions extend to
presumptively covered expressive conduct or even solely linguistic
communications, such as claiming, for instance, official government
authority in a letter or in an oral statement. Often, though, this
presumptively covered expression will be part of a larger illicit
scheme of conduct to obtain unlawful financial benefits, classified

Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761–62. Osborne relied on the speech integral to criminal conduct
discussion from Ferber as one of its several rationales for holding possession of child
pornography likewise outside First Amendment coverage. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109–
10. For critiques of these decisions, see Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 291 (2001); Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 145, at 1324–26.
282
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008) (holding that, as “[o]ffers
to engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment
protection” in accord with Giboney, so are “offers to provide or requests to obtain
child pornography”); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388–89 (1973) (holding that a newspaper could be
prohibited under a sexual discrimination law from publishing help-wanted
advertisements in sex-designated columns).
283
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 709 (prohibiting unauthorized use of the names of several
listed federal agencies in a manner calculated to convey that the communication has
official authorization or approval); 18 U.S.C. § 712 (prohibiting using “Federal,”
“national,” or the “United States” to convey official authorization to collect private
debts or perform investigative services); 18 U.S.C. § 912 (prohibiting impersonating
an officer or employee of the United States).
284
See 18 U.S.C. § 912.
285
Cf. United States v. Alvarez 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2554 (2012) (Breyer, J.,
concurring). Although I agree that some of the proscriptions under the statute
involve activities outside the First Amendment’s scope, Justice Breyer’s suggestion
that the statute only reaches “acts of impersonation, not mere speech” is
overinclusive. See id.
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information, or some other outlawed advantage. These are the
situations that are encompassed within the speech integral to
criminal conduct exception, properly understood.
Giboney’s cited authority reveals that the speech integral to
criminal conduct exception arose from the earlier “bad tendency”
286
doctrine.
At the founding and into the twentieth century, as
discussed in Part II.A.1, the judicially accepted bounds of this
doctrine were quite broad, permitting a ban on any communicative
attempt with a “bad tendency” to cause crime, disorder, or immoral
287
acts.
Yet due to changing attitudes regarding the value of such
speech, as well as the chilling effect of government censorship over
such an extensive realm, the Court retreated from such a blanket
288
exception in the mid-twentieth century.
In its place, the Court
adopted much narrower categorical exclusions—including one for
incitement of illegal activity and another for speech integral to
289
criminal conduct. Because advocacy of illegal activity is covered by
the First Amendment unless intended and likely to incite imminent
290
lawless action, a comparable limitation is necessary for the speech
integral to criminal conduct exception. Otherwise, the Court’s
circumscription of incitement would be meaningless, as the
government could simply criminalize the linguistic communication
itself as an independent illegal act and then assert that the advocacy
constituted speech integral to criminal conduct. The speech integral
to criminal conduct exception should accordingly require that the
communication is in furtherance of the speaker’s actual participation
in a larger scheme or attempted scheme of illegal nonlinguistic
conduct. Speech by a participant in the actual or attempted
commission of a crime has little if any intrinsic value, and the harms
are substantial, authorizing the government to continue to
criminalize such speech as it has done since the founding.
On the other hand, speech that is neither part of an illegal
scheme nor within another well-recognized category should not be
removed from First Amendment coverage. Is there any way, then,
that the statutory prohibitions against false representations of
286

Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502 (citing, e.g., Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277
(1915) (upholding conviction for publishing an article that “encourages and incites
a persistence in what we must assume would be a breach of the state laws against
indecent exposure”)).
287
See CURTIS, supra note 124, at 10–12.
288
See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23–26 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
289
Cf. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2010) (listing categories).
290
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
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government authority could be enforced against solely linguistic
representations not seeking an illegal advantage or causing other
cognizable harm? In these (I would imagine rare) circumstances,
speech representing government authority in communications would
appear to fall within the other exception to presumptive First
Amendment coverage, for speech attributed to the government or
polity. A false claim of government authority differs from a false
claim of receipt of a government award or honor—it is the
representation that the speech is on behalf of the government that
implicates the speech attributed to the government exception, not
the mere fact that the speaker is making a misrepresentation. Just as
a legislative vote belongs to the constituents rather than the
legislator, speech on the government’s behalf belongs to the
291
government to bestow as it sees fit, not to an individual.
When a
person claims to be speaking on the government’s behalf, those
receiving the communication will reasonably attribute the message to
the government, like the reasonable observer attributes a monument
292
on government property to the government. The government has
the right to control the speech transmitted in its name, which is
necessary to ensure both that its preferred messages are not distorted
293
and that the public trust is not betrayed.
The judiciary has long
acquiesced in these venerable prohibitions against impersonations
294
and other false representations of official authority. Moreover, the
intrinsic value of falsely representing government authority is
minimal when balanced against the harmful impact on government
integrity and citizen confidence.
Prohibiting such false
representations does not foreclose numerous other avenues of
communication—the only proscription is that the message cannot
falsely be attributed to the government.
The Alvarez plurality thus reached the correct conclusion that
these statutes fell within other existing First Amendment coverage
exclusions and accordingly did not evidence a broader exception for
false factual statements. Nevertheless, its superficial evaluation belied
the complexity of the presented questions. The doctrinal structure I
have discussed here, on the other hand, establishes a context for
resolving these difficult issues, ensuring the appropriate questions are
being considered. Although I cannot address its application to all
291

Cf. Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347–51 (2011).
Cf. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 471 (2009).
293
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–200 (1991).
294
See, e.g., United States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74, 77–78 (1915) (upholding a
predecessor statute).
292
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potential iterations of speech and speaker coverage issues here, the
foregoing examples indicate its analytical utility.
IV. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S RANGE
This Article has explored the Supreme Court’s doctrine on the
dimensions of the First Amendment, the initial query in free speech
cases. I have omitted subsequent speech issues, examining neither
the appropriate scrutiny for evaluating the varieties of expression nor
the application of these standards to ascertain the expression that the
First Amendment protects (rather than merely covers). Yet insights
from this project are nonetheless of some consequence.
The Supreme Court’s coverage doctrine fundamentally depends
on prior judicial acquiescence in historical traditions and
contemporary judicial perceptions of the expression’s relative
valuation. At least one of these considerations—and frequently
both—appeared in the cases in which the Court considered the First
295
Amendment’s scope at any length. And this was whether the Court
was determining when word usage was outside the First Amendment’s
coverage, or when communicative attempts without words fell within
its coverage. These historical traditions and contemporary insights
are the foundations for the described coverage structure, which
envelops all communicative attempts that were viewed as within
constitutional expressive guarantees at the founding, plus all
additional forms recognized since that time holding relative
communicative value. The assurance that all traditionally expressive
forms continue to maintain coverage has normative appeal in
constraining ad hoc judicial experimentation with the First
Amendment’s reach. The framework, though, is not chained to the
past, but allows the expansion of First Amendment coverage as new
philosophical and moral understandings emerge.
Yet acceptance of this structural framework is not necessary to
infer other lessons from the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
coverage doctrine.
The First Amendment, in addition to its
cherished allure, has a constitutional function in our democratic
system to protect expression from government censorship and
overreaching. Judicial decisions and legal traditions related to this
function reveal “our historical commitments and principles”
necessary to divine the underlying purposes of the expressive
296
guarantee. My overview at a minimum reveals the key combination
295
296

See supra Part II.
Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L.
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of historical understandings and contemporary valuation in the
judiciary’s demarcation of the First Amendment’s coverage, which
holds some broader implications for free speech theory.
One implication is the often overlooked significance of original
meanings in the First Amendment context. It is frequently asserted
that originalism is of minimal value in First Amendment analysis, as
ascertaining a coherent theory of expression from the founding
generation is irrealizable, and, in any event, founding views are too
297
provincial to govern modern First Amendment controversies. And
certainly these objections are undeniable with respect to employing
an original meaning theory as the sole determinant of First
Amendment protection—or even coverage—today. Yet I have
illustrated that the original public meaning of expressive protections,
indicated by founding judicial traditions and laws, is frequently
viewed by the Supreme Court as a key ingredient in discerning the
contemporary minimum scope, or baseline, of First Amendment
coverage. Because the laws and judicial decisions from early America
are at least strong evidence (if not determinative) of this minimal
radius, the original understandings of free expression—as indicated
by the practices of early American generations—are worth
298
examining.
Yet the fact that founding practices must be explored, rather
than seeking to obtain a coherent First Amendment theoretical
understanding from the framers, highlights the impasse in
299
identifying a “metatheory” of the First Amendment.
The free
speech practices during the founding and subsequent early American
generations did not result from a singular theoretical conception, but
rather from the influences of several different political,
philosophical, and social strands, including Blackstonian legal
maxims, Enlightenment philosophy, the English Radical Whig
REV. 617, 618 (2011).
297
See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 952; Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 596 n.27 (1982); 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE B.
NIMMER, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 1–17 (1994); Stone, Sex, supra
note 113, at 1863 n.38; DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 52–62 (2010);
Wright, supra note 1, at 1221–22.
298
For recent examples of an original meaning investigation of First Amendment
issues, see Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable
Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 12–32 (2011); Eugene
Volokh, Tort Liability and the Original Meaning of the Freedom of Speech, Press, and Petition,
96 IOWA L. REV. 249, 250–59 (2010); Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression, supra note
24, at 1057–63.
299
Cf. Tribe, supra note 145, at 238 (comparing “wholly satisfying free speech
theories” to “unicorns” that “evidently do not exist”).
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tradition, revolutionary upheavals, and American conceptions of
300
These various
popular sovereignty and republican government.
strands, even though never coalescing into a coherent theory,
influenced legal traditions and practices that allowed, at least for the
301
times, substantial expressive freedoms. As these historical practices
influence the Supreme Court’s modern coverage doctrine, a
contemporary unifying theory has to integrate these traditional
commitments, even with their multifarious origins.
A further complication to a satisfactory substantive theory is that
the expansion in expressive coverage since the founding has not
arisen from a common underpinning, but rather in response to
various national and local episodes challenging our commitments to
and understandings of the First Amendment. The intersection of
judicial, political, media, and public responses to some of these
consequential episodes—including the Sedition Act controversy,
antebellum abolitionist speech, labor protests, war dissent, the Red
Scare, and civil rights protests—have had profound influence on the
302
dimensions of the First Amendment.
As Professor Stone has
suggested, these crises and other American experiences have led to a
modern First Amendment doctrine that “is largely the product of
303
practical experience rather than philosophical reasoning.”
The import of these practical experiences has been debated, not
just within the judiciary, but also among the political branches, the
media, dissidents, public interest groups, litigants, the public at large,
and the academy. The participants in these debates, despite their
300

See David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of
Expression in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795, 821–54 (1985) (describing
influences on the founding generation).
301
See id. at 799–800; accord LEVY, FREE PRESS, supra note 123, at xvi–xvii
(expressing surprise at the relatively liberal press freedoms at the founding in the
absence of a theoretical justification).
302
For noteworthy books recounting these episodes and their impact on free
speech principles, see CURTIS, supra note 124 (focusing on antebellum free speech
controversies regarding the Sedition Act, abolition, and the Civil War); DAVID M.
RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS, 1870–1920 (Cambridge University
Press 1990) (detailing free speech disputes between 1870-1920 involving labor issues,
political issues, electoral reform, sexual radicalism, and advertising that were
addressed by judges, law professors, government officials, activists, philosophers, and
the general public); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME:
FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004) (discussing
political, judicial, public, and dissident reactions to American wartime speech
restrictions).
303
Stone, Lessons, supra note 263, at 276–78; accord Vincent Blasi, The Pathological
Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 460–62 (1985) (describing
First Amendment commitments being formed through “political experience”
gradually leading to new understandings).
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disparate conceptions of the First Amendment, have all influenced
304
Our traditions thus encapsulate a
our free expressive traditions.
multitude of views on the substantive underpinnings of expressive
305
freedom. Participatory democracy and self-government,
public
306
constraints on institutional government, the marketplace of ideas
307
and search for truth and knowledge, individual self-realization and
308
autonomy, and other conceptions have all been integrated to some
309
A “generous range” of values underlies the First
extent.
Amendment, as indicated by the Supreme Court’s consistent refusal
to confine expressive freedom to a singular, or even predominant,
310
conception.
But I do not mean to suggest that identifying “the bundle of
311
312
interrelated principles” or the “hierarchy of values” undergirding
304

Cf. Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 1, at 1788.
See, e.g., Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 245, 255 (contending First Amendment produces an informed and responsible
democratic electorate through both political and non-political communications);
Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482–83 (2011)
(highlighting First Amendment “value of democratic self-governance,” which
encompasses the “necessary and proper means of participating in the formation of
public opinion”); Weinstein, Participatory Democracy, supra note 14, at 491 (urging
primary speech justification is opportunity “for individuals to participate in the
speech by which we govern ourselves”). This listing is not intended to imply
agreement among these scholars. See Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual
Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1114–19 (1993).
306
See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 529–44 (contending First Amendment is valuable in part as a
check on official abuse of power).
307
See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (urging that First Amendment furthers “the best test of truth,” which is
acceptance of the thought “in the competition of the marketplace”); William P.
Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L.
REV. 1, 38–39 (1995) (explaining that the “search for the truth suggests that what is
valuable in human conduct is more than only the political” and more “than pursuing
self-interest,” but includes the “ability to freely choose . . . ideas and beliefs and that
beliefs and ideas have value”).
308
See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA
L. REV. 964, 992 (1978) (contending speech is important to define, develop, or
express “the self”); Redish, supra note 297, at 594 (urging First Amendment serves a
single ultimate value of individual self-realization that is broader than Baker’s
conception); Seana Valentine Shriffin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech,
27 CONST. COMMENT. 283, 287 (2011) (proposing a thinker-based autonomy theory
protecting the mind’s free development and operation).
309
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 952–59.
310
Steven Shriffin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1252 (1983).
311
Schauer, Categories, supra note 11, at 277.
312
James Weinstein, Institutional Review Boards and the Constitution, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. 493, 512 (2007).
305
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the First Amendment is unimportant. Our continued dialectic
influences—and will continue to influence—judicial, political, media,
and public attitudes toward the First Amendment. These attitudes
help shape the scope of the First Amendment, as the other key factor
in the Supreme Court’s coverage doctrine is its perspective on the
value of the underlying speech in relation to its harms. I have not
attempted here to adopt a theory (or a combination of theories) for
the substantive valuation of speech, an undertaking far afield from
my focus here on the structure of the Court’s coverage doctrine. But
I nonetheless recognize the importance of the theoretical
underpinnings of the First Amendment in giving life to the structure
I have described. For now, I must leave this vital issue to our
continued evolution of First Amendment traditions, which will
inform expressive coverage for both the speaker and the speech.

